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Impacts of Express Bus Service on 
Passenger Demand
Jeffrey M. Casello, Ph.D., P.E. 
Bruce Hellinga, Ph.D., P.Eng. 
University of Waterloo
Abstract
The Region of Waterloo, Ontario, is a rapidly-growing metropolitan area approxi-
mately 100 km west of Toronto. In 2005, the Region’s transit operator, Grand River 
Transit, introduced an express bus service, known as iXpress, along the central north-
south corridor of the Region. This paper explores the impact of the iXpress service on 
transit user costs and passenger attraction. We employ a methodology to quantify 
the generalized cost (including waiting time, in-vehicle and transfer times) of transit 
trips between key destinations in the Region before and after the implementation of 
iXpress. We also develop a methodology to identify those customers who benefit from 
the reduced cost of the iXpress. Finally, we present the change in ridership (boardings) 
in the corridor pre- and post-implementation. From these demand and cost data, we 
compute transit elasticity of demand with respect to generalized cost. 
Introduction
The Region of Waterloo,1 located approximately 100 km west of Toronto in south-
ern Ontario, comprises three cities—Kitchener, Waterloo and Cambridge—and 
four rural townships. The Region has a population of approximately 500,000 but 
is expected to reach 730,000 by 2031 (Region of Waterloo 2003.) Commensurate 
job growth is also predicted. In response to these growth pressures, the Region of 
Waterloo (2003) developed a Regional Growth Management Strategy (RGMS) to 
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manage the locations of new homes and jobs and to provide suitable transporta-
tion alternatives. A principle component of the RGMS is a balanced transportation 
system that promotes multimodal travel options and leads to intensified land 
uses. One major investment in the Region’s Grand River Transit (GRT) has been 
the introduction of an express bus service, known as iXpress, connecting major 
activity centers along the region’s central north-south corridor. 
Figure 1. Location and Composition of the Regional Municipality of  
Waterloo in Southern Ontario 
This paper develops and applies a methodology to analyze the impacts of the 
iXpress on travel costs and ridership in an existing transit corridor. We compute 
the differences in generalized costs (including waiting time, in-vehicle time, and 
transfer time) for travel between major activity centers in the Region before and 
after the introduction of iXpress. We define and apply a methodology to identify 
transit customers who benefit from the introduction of the iXpress service. We 
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also present the number of boardings in a service corridor that took place pre- and 
post-implementation of the iXpress service. Based on the reduction in generalized 
cost and increase in ridership, we compute the elasticity of transit demand with 
respect to generalized cost. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section presents 
a literature review of generalized cost formulations and elasticity models for ana-
lyzing transit demand. In the third section, further detail is provided on the Region 
of Waterloo and the iXpress service. Section four presents the methodology used 
in computing generalized costs and applies that method to the case study. Elastici-
ties are presented. In section five, the results of elasticity computations are ana-
lyzed and the shortcomings of elasticity models are presented. Section six presents 
conclusions and suggestions for further research.
Literature Review
The concept of utility theory suggests that consumers choose an alternative 
that possesses a set of characteristics that maximizes the benefit derived by the 
consumer (Lancaster 1966). Transportation studies often assume that travelers 
derive no utility from the trip itself, but rather travel to achieve other goals (i.e., 
work, shopping, education etc.) Thus, travel consumers are modeled not as utility 
maximizers, but instead as disutility (or generalized cost) minimizers. Disutility 
of transit travel has the following components (Kittelson and Associates 2003): 
access time to transit service, waiting time, in-vehicle time, transfer times (where 
applicable), egress times, and fares. Typically, the relative contribution to overall 
disutility of these individual attributes is expressed by a weighted, linear sum of 
the attributes (Ortuzar and Williamson 2001). For example, most studies suggest 
that passengers perceive waiting time and transfer time to be more onerous than 
in-vehicle travel times.
Utility theory has long been used in mode choice models to predict transit rider-
ship. When choosing between competing modes (typically transit and auto), a 
traveler’s propensity to choose a given mode is a function of the relative general-
ized costs, or disutility, of the competing modes. Often, logit or probit models are 
used to compute the probability of choosing a mode amongst a set of candidate 
modes based on a comparison of their generalized costs (Ben Akiva and Leman 
1985). These models often are employed at the regional level as part of travel 
forecasting work.
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Utility models have been employed to assess the impacts of potential changes in 
transit services on transit ridership in regional corridors. Examples of this type of 
study include Kopp et al. (2006) in Chicago and Casello (2007) in Philadelphia. The 
benefits of corridor-level analysis are that it allows for a more detailed representa-
tion of transit costs than is possible when working at a regional level and requires 
significantly less data and computational effort. As such, corridor-level analysis 
may be feasible for transit agencies to complete in-house, thereby reducing reli-
ance on consultants or external travel models. 
The output of corridor level analysis may also be elasticities of demand with 
respect to generalized cost that may be assumed to be valid within the study area. 
The use of elasticities to predict changes in travel habits has been studied exten-
sively. A comprehensive reference list of such studies is presented by Taylor and 
Miller (2003). In the same paper, the authors present a two stage, least-squares 
regression that considers the ridership impacts of non-transportation variables 
(geography, economy, and population) as well as transport variables (auto owner-
ship, fuel prices, transit supply and cost). Their results are consistent with most 
other studies—that transit supply (positively correlated) and fares (negatively 
correlated) are both statistically significant predictors of transit ridership, which 
explain much (in their case, 95%) of the variation in ridership.
In the current application, the generalized cost, or disutility, of travel is computed 
without and with the iXpress service. The change in disutility is correlated to 
changes in ridership through standard elasticity models. Litman (2004) defines 
short- and long-term elasticities and presents the findings for various inputs (fares, 
auto costs, income, etc.), modes, and locations. A more sophisticated summary 
of previous studies is presented by Holmgren (2007), who utilizes a meta-analysis 
method to draw conclusions about the importance of functional form, data inclu-
sion, data types, and environmental factors on predicted elasticities. Holmgren 
also presents observed ranges of several demand elasticities (price, supply, income, 
auto ownership, and fuel prices). Balcombe et al. (2004) present elasticities for 
various components of generalized costs using UK examples.
Ideally, the travel patterns of individual transit customers could be surveyed 
and recorded, and changes in behavior in response to changes in transit services 
could be evaluated on an individual origin-destination basis. This would require 
extensive data collection that would only be feasible if fully automated, perhaps 
through smart card fare collection technology. In the absence of smart cards, we 
suggest that corridor level analysis provides an appropriate balance between data 
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requirements and the robustness of the ridership projections. The potential levels 
of transit analysis are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Possible Levels of Analysis for Predicting Changes in Ridership  
as a Result of Transit Service Change
The current paper builds upon the existing literature in several ways. First, the 
paper develops and implements a method to analyze comprehensively the change 
in travel parameters as a result of the proposed transit service upgrades. Second, 
the paper applies utility theory to compute the changes in generalized costs for 
trips made between major activity centers. The changes in generalized cost are 
then compared to observed changes in ridership to compute mid-run elasticities 
for a specific case. The calculated elasticities are compared to previously published 
results.
The Region of Waterloo and iXpress service
Waterloo Region is one of the most diverse and dynamic economic regions in 
Canada. The area extending from Toronto in the east, Niagara Falls in the south, 
and the Region of Waterloo in the west is known as the Greater Golden Horseshoe 
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(GGH). The GGH is often referred to as the economic engine of Ontario. The entire 
GGH is experiencing strong development pressures. The Province of Ontario has 
produced a strategic plan known as “Places to Grow,” which intends to steer devel-
opment to targeted built-up areas. The Region of Waterloo is one of these areas.
The Region itself is a significant contributor to the national economy, with an 
annual estimated regional GDP of over $16 billion (CDN) derived from a strong 
mix of agricultural, manufacturing, and service sector employment. A major chal-
lenge for the Region in light of the projected growth is to accommodate increased 
housing and employment lands without diminishing the value of local agricultural 
activities. Moreover, the Region currently experiences very little congestion. The 
intention of Regional planners is to develop a balanced, multi-modal transporta-
tion system that will both facilitate future travel demands and positively influence 
land uses (achieve intensification). The iXpress service is a major step towards bal-
anced transportation alternatives in the Region.
iXpress Service
The iXpress is a limited-stop, express service that travels between Waterloo, Kitch-
ener, and Cambridge. The alignment, shown in Figure 2, is approximately 33 km in 
length and consists of 13 stops. Along the route are four downtowns (two in Cam-
bridge), two universities, office complexes, major hospitals, and regional shopping 
centers. When the iXpress service commenced in September 2005, it operated 
between 06:45 and 19:00 Monday through Friday, with 15-minute headways dur-
ing the morning and afternoon peak periods and 30-minute headways during the 
midday. In the fall of 2007, weekday service was extended to 05:40 and 23:00; Sat-
urday and Sunday services were introduced. The iXpress service is provided using 
standard 40-foot Nova low-floor buses that are differentiated from buses servicing 
local routes by unique exterior branding. 
Prior to 1999, transit service was operated by two independent providers—one 
serving Kitchener and Waterloo, the other serving Cambridge. In 2000, the system 
was unified under a single operator, the Region of Waterloo, which created Grand 
River Transit. Despite unifying operations, the previous route structure remained. 
Prior to the introduction of iXpress, no single-seat connections were provided 
between Cambridge and points north of Fairview Mall; all trips between Cam-
bridge and central Kitchener and Waterloo required a transfer. 
In addition to providing regional connectivity, the introduction of iXpress supple-
mented a local transit route (Route 7) within Kitchener and Waterloo, between 
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the Fairview and Conestoga Mall iXpress stops. Route 7 is operated with three 
northern branches—two terminating at the University of Waterloo and one 
terminating at Conestoga Mall. During peak periods, Route 7 headways on the 
common section are approximately 5 minutes and 15 minutes for each branch. 
Note that no direct (single-seat) service is provided by Route 7 from the Univer-
sity of Waterloo to Conestoga Mall. iXpress also supplements two local routes 
in Cambridge. Route 51 connects three activity centers—the Ainslie, Cambridge 
Center and Hespler terminals along Hespler Road, a major commercial artery in 
the Region. Route 52 connects the Ainslie terminal and Fairview Mall via King St. 
in Cambridge and Highway 8 in Kitchener. 
The next sections demonstrate a methodology to quantify the benefits and ben-
eficiaries as a result of the implementation of iXpress.
Methodology
The goals of this paper are to demonstrate a method to analyze the impacts of 
express bus service on transit users’ costs, to identify those users who benefit from 
Figure 2. iXpress and Local Routes Connecting Activity Centers in  
Cambridge, Kitchener and Waterloo
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these reduced costs, and finally to correlate changes in cost to ridership gains. To 
estimate the reductions in user costs, we quantify the changes in travel costs for 
three travel patterns:
1. The corridor between Ainslie St. Terminal and Smartcentres, where the 
iXpress supplements Route 51. This represents travel between activity 
centers within the city of Cambridge.
2. Trips between Ainslie Terminal, Fairview Mall, and all points along the Route 
7 alignments. This represents travel between one Cambridge activity center 
and many activity centers in Kitchener and Waterloo.
3. The corridor between Fairview Mall and Conestoga Mall, including the Uni-
versity of Waterloo, but not Tech Park or McCormick because local service 
was not previously provided to those stops. This quantifies the improvement 
as a result of iXpress in the existing Route 7 corridor.
In our case, the introduction of express service affects passengers in the following 
ways:
•	 For	the	travel	patterns	considered,	iXpress	operates	on	the	same	alignment	
as local service so that the access and egress times for express service are 
the same as the local service. We therefore eliminate access and egress time 
from our generalized cost computations.
•	 iXpress	may	increase	or	decrease	passenger	waiting	times,	depending	on	the	
frequency of the existing local service in the corridor and the specific origin 
and destination of the traveler (see section on waiting times, below).
•	 iXpress	reduces	in-vehicle	times	because	there	are	fewer	stops	than	on	local	
service.
•	 iXpress	connects	origin-destination	pairs	directly,	eliminating	the	need	for	
passenger transfers.
Waiting times, in-vehicle times and transfer times are analyzed in detail in the fol-
lowing sections. 
Waiting Times
In calculating passenger waiting times, we make the following assumptions. First, 
we assume that wait time is correlated to service frequency as follows. For short 
headways, less than or equal to 10 minutes, we assume random passenger arrivals 
and an average wait time of ½ the headway. For headways greater than 10 minutes, 
we assume passengers consult schedules, but still allow slightly longer wait times. 
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Mathematically, we apply the following continuous functions to compute wait 
times:
 
Eq. 1
where:  WT is the waiting time in minutes
  h is the headway in minutes.
For headways greater than 10 minutes, Equation 1 predicts a wait time that 
increases as headways increase, but moves asymptotically to a maximum wait 
time of 10 minutes. This model is very similar to that found empirically by Lam and 
Morall (1982), as shown in Figure 3. Sensitivity to this waiting time formulation is 
explored in subsequent sections.
Figure 3. Comparison of Predicting Waiting Times  
by Lam and Morrall and Eq. 1
In considering traveler behavior, we are faced with three alternatives. We may 
assume that customers prefer single-seat rides (trips without transfers) and, there-
fore, extend their wait time for iXpress to avoid a transfer. Alternatively, we may 
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assume that customers minimize their wait times by boarding the first arriving 
vehicle regardless if a transfer is necessary. The third alternative, which we apply in 
our method, is the assumption that transit customers choose the lowest general-
ized cost alternative of the previous two choices. This is consistent with oft-cited 
user equilibrium condition.
Travel Time Analysis
Because of its limited stops, iXpress has significantly shorter travel time compared 
to local routes that serve the same alignment. We compute the difference in inter-
station travel times for trips completed by local routes (7, 51, and 52) and trips 
completed by iXpress in each of the travel corridors. Note that this analysis consid-
ers only the difference in in-vehicle time; transfer times are considered separately 
in the next section.
Transfer Times
The method developed by Vuchic (2005) to estimate average transfer times 
between two lines with headways h1 and h2 , as presented in Equation 2, is used.
 
 
Eq. 2
Where:
E(TT)  expected (average) transfer time, min
h1  time headway of originating line, min
h2   time headway of destination line, min
Using Equation 2, we compute the transfer times necessary for local trips that 
include routes 51 and 7 (transfers at Fairview Mall) and between branches of 
Route 7 (transfers at Laurier). No transfers are required for trips on the iXpress. 
Computing Generalized Cost
Having computed the changes in each cost component (waiting, in-vehicle and 
transfer times), generalized costs for travel between all O-D pairs is calculated. The 
generalized cost, GC, is calculated as shown in Equation 3.
 
Eq. 3
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Where: 
GC generalized cost for travel from origin O to destination D via route i, $ 
i relative weight of cost component i
WT waiting time, min
INVT  in-vehicle travel time, min
TT  transfer time, min
VOT value of time, $/hr
fare Transit fare, $
Passengers perceive the passage of time differently for each portion of their trip 
(i.e., wait time at the stop, in-vehicle time, and transfer time). Because we have no 
local information on the relative weights of the cost components, we utilize the 
mean values presented in Kittelson et al. (2003, p. 3-20), as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Relative Weights of Cost Components  
Used in Generalized Cost Calculations
 
Many wide-ranging estimates exist for value of travel time in the literature. We 
use a simple estimate of value of time, $8 per hour. Because our analysis involves 
percent reductions in travel costs, our findings are largely insensitive to the value 
of time assumption. The GRT pre-paid fare is $1.40.
We are primarily concerned with the reduction in generalized costs for passengers 
after the implementation of the iXpress service. As such, we define the reduction 
in generalized cost, GC as:
 
Eq. 4
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Where: GCL is the generalized cost from O to D via local service, $
  GCX is the generalized cost from O to D via iXpress service, $
As noted above, this method assumes that passengers choose the lowest-cost 
alternative. In the cases where local service is less expensive than iXpress, then we 
see a zero reduction in generalized cost.
Finally, we compute the percent change in generalized cost as shown in Equation 
5:
 
Eq. 5
Corridor 1 Analysis
In Corridor 1, existing Route 51 service with a frequency of two buses per hour is 
supplemented by four iXpress runs per hour. The iXpress also has shorter travel 
times, saving five minutes between Ainslie Terminal and Cambridge Centre and 
an additional six minutes between Cambridge Centre and Smartcentres. Neither 
route requires a transfer. The steps in computing the change in generalized cost 
are summarized in Table 3.
Because of the reduced in-vehicle and waiting times, the introduction of iXpress 
reduces generalized costs between these origin-destination pairs by between 22 
and 27 percent.
Corridor 2 Analysis
In Corridor 2, iXpress connects origin-destination pairs that were previously 
served by Route 7 with high frequency service. As a result, many of the main line 
station pairs remain best served by local service. Naturally, as the distance traveled 
increases, the benefits of higher speeds on iXpress offset longer waiting times, and 
benefits are derived for iXpress trips. For the University of Waterloo, iXpress intro-
duces higher-frequency, direct connections in both the north and southbound 
directions. Significant reductions in generalized costs are experienced for trips 
beginning from or destined for the University.
Using the same methodology presented in the Corridor 1 analysis, we compute 
the reductions in generalized costs as a result of iXpress between origin-destina-
tion pairs in Corridor 2. These are shown in Table 4.
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Table 3. Full Methodology for Computing Reduction in Generalized Cost  
as a Result of iXpress Service
 
Table 4. Percent Reductions in Generalized Costs for O-D Pairs in Corridor 2
The range of travel cost savings for this corridor is 0 percent (where the local ser-
vice remains the lowest cost option) to 33 percent for travel between Conestoga 
and the University of Waterloo.
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Corridor 3 Analysis
In the Corridor 3 analysis, we attempt to identify the cost savings between Ainslie 
Terminal and northern activity centers. This analysis is a measure of the regional 
connectivity improvements as a result of iXpress. Table 5 shows the cost reduc-
tions. For simplicity, only the reductions in cost from Ainslie Terminal to all north-
ern stops are shown; the cost savings are symmetric.
Table 5. Percent Reduction in Generalized Costs for Trips Originating from 
the Ainslie St. Terminal (Corridor 3)
The range of cost savings in this case is between 16 and 28 percent.
Identifying Transit Customers Who Benefit from iXpress
To identify those customers who benefit from the introduction of iXpress, we 
consider those transit riders who travel in Corridor 2. As shown in Figure 3, there 
are four trip types that involve some travel through the corridor: 
1. Type I: a trip that both begins and ends in the corridor (O1, D1)
2. Type II: a trip that begins outside the corridor on a local route, L1, but ends 
in the corridor (O2, D1) via a transfer 
3. Type III: a trip that begins in the corridor but ends outside the corridor (O1, 
D2) via a transfer to a local route, L2 
4. Type IV: a trip that begins outside the corridor on a local route, L1, transfers 
for travel through the corridor, then transfers to a local route, L2, to reach 
the destination (O2, D2)
Prior to the introduction of iXpress, all trips through the corridor involved only 
Route 7. After the introduction of iXpress, each of these trips may involve a trans-
fer to either iXpress or to Route 7, whichever involves the lowest generalized cost. 
The benefits derived as a result of iXpress differs for each of these trip types. Table 
6 quantifies these benefits. 
In each case, the potential generalized cost saving is the same—the reduction 
associated with the iXpress compared to the Route 7 service. The percent reduc-
tion, however, varies for each trip type. For those trips that involve transfer to 
and/or from local service, the time savings along the central corridor represents a 
smaller percentage of total trip time. This is indicated by the increasing denomina-
tor in the third column of Table 6.
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Figure 4. Identifying the Trip Patterns Influenced by the Introduction of iXpress
Table 6. Reductions in Generalized Cost (Total and %) for Each Trip Type
Correlating Changes in Generalized Cost to Ridership Gains
A common economic tool to predict changes in demand as a result of changes in 
price is to compute elasticity of demand with respect to price. Mathematically, 
elasticity, E, is defined as:
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Eq. 6
Where:  D is the change in demand, %
  P is the change in price, %
In our case, we have computed the change in generalized cost for trips between 
individual origin-destination pairs. As noted in the literature review, ideally these 
changes in O-D costs could be compared to changes in ridership between O-D 
pairs. However, due to data limitations, only the change in corridor demand is 
known. Therefore, to compute elasticities, we utilize these changes in O-D costs 
to compute a corridor-wide change in generalized cost. 
From ridership surveys (Region of Waterloo 2005), the percentage of total trips 
between each O-D pair is known. Therefore, to compute a corridor-wide elasticity, 
we calculate a weighted average of reduced generalized costs within the corridor 
based on travel patterns. Mathematically, this average is given by:
 
Eq. 7
Where:  GC is the weighted average of generalized cost savings, $
  TOD is the observed percentage of transit trips from origin 
   to destination
The percentages of trips between origin destination pairs are given in Table 7. 
From Equation 7, we compute a weighted average generalized cost reduction of 
14.1 percent. 
This calculation provides the average benefits accrued for travel within the cor-
ridor. As noted in the previous section, not all travelers realize this full benefit. 
Those who make trip type I accrue the full benefit. For trip types II, III and IV, a 
lesser benefit is realized as a percentage of total trip cost.
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Table 7. Percentage of Travel Between All O-D Pairs
To estimate the benefits realized by travelers making trip types II - IV, we make 
the following assumption. We assume that the travel cost on each local section is 
equal to the travel cost in the corridor. Mathematically, we assume:
GCL1 = GCL2 = GC7 Eq. 8
This results in trip types II and III experiencing one half the generalized cost reduc-
tion and trip type IV experiencing one third the cost reduction. 
Again, from travel surveys, we know the percentage of trip makers through the 
corridor that makes trips of each type. We can then weigh the number of trip 
takers by their expected reduction in generalized cost to compute a final, corridor-
wide reduction in generalized costs. These calculations are shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Computing Corridor-Wide Reduction in Generalized Cost
 
Thus, the introduction of the iXpress service in the corridor reduced cost by an 
average of 9.5 percent.
Finally, to compute elasticity, we calculate the percent change in demand through 
the corridor. Prior to the introduction of iXpress, there were 15,941 boardings in 
the Route 7 corridor. When boardings were counted in the corridor after iXpress, 
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there were 16,528 boardings on Route 7 and 2,701 boardings on iXpress, for a total 
of 19,229. 
In the time between the two counts, GRT system ridership grew by 7 percent sys-
tem wide. To account for this growth, we compute the difference in actual board-
ings (19,229) to expected boardings (15,941*1.07=17,057) assuming ridership on 
Route 7 grew at the system average. This calculation results in a net growth of 
2,172 boardings, or 12.7 percent.
The elasticity of demand with respect to generalized cost can be computed using 
equation 6, with D = 12.7% and P = 9.5%. The elasticity, E, is then equal to 
-1.3.
Understanding Model Results
Other researchers (as summarized by Litman and Balcombe et al.) typically 
observed absolute values of short-term elasticities for quality of service, quantity 
of supply, and price in the range of 0.5 to 0.7, and long-term in the range of 0.7 
to 1.1. The elasticity observed in this research (which can be considered short- to 
mid-term) is -1.3, which is inconsistent with the previous findings. We suggest 
that this surprisingly large value is a result of computing the elasticity of ridership 
with respect to the composite generalized cost. As noted above, in our case, the 
introduction of the iXpress results in decreased waiting time, shortened in-vehicle 
time, and fewer transfers. The results of previous research (Balcombe et al. 2004) 
suggests a mean elasticity value for ridership with respect to passenger waiting 
time of -0.64; the same research reports a mean value of elasticity of ridership with 
respect to in-vehicle time of -0.5. No study was found to directly compute the 
elasticity for ridership with respect to transfer times. 
Consider the following example. If waiting time were reduced by 10 percent, 
using an elasticity value of -0.64, ridership is expected to increase by 6.4 percent. 
Subsequently, if in-vehicle travel time were reduced by 10 percent, ridership is 
expected to increase by an additional 5.0 percent. The total increase is calculated 
as 1.064*1.05 or 1.117 or 11.7 percent. Using our generalized cost representation 
and assuming no transfer, if both in-vehicle time and waiting time were reduced 
by 10 percent (as in the previous case), then the generalized cost would be reduced 
by 10 percent. From our elasticity finding of -1.3, we would expect an increase in 
ridership of 13 percent, which is consistent with previous findings.
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Sensitivity Analysis
In assigning the relative weights of travel disutility (equation 3), we assumed the 
average value presented by Kittelson et al. Further, we assumed a standard value 
of time of $8.00 per hour. To assess the sensitivity of our findings to these assumed 
values, we present the following analysis. We recomputed the percent reduction 
in generalized cost in the corridor while varying each of the assumptions from a 
minimum of 0.5 times the initial value to a maximum of 1.5 times the initial value. 
For example, in the initial analysis, we assume waiting time is considered 2.1 times 
as onerous as in-vehicle time. To test the sensitivity, we compute the reductions in 
generalized costs if waiting time ranged from 1.05 times to 3.15 times as onerous 
as in-vehicle time. Similarly, we test values for transfer time that range from 1.25 to 
3.75. Finally, we compute percent reductions in generalized travel costs for ranges 
of value of time from $4.00 to $12.00. The results are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Sensitivity of Generalized Cost Reductions to  
Parameter Assumptions
When all the initial parameters are multiplied by 1.00, the reductions in general-
ized cost equal the result presented in the previous section, approximately 9.5 
percent. In analyzing each parameter, it is noted that the reductions in generalized 
costs are most sensitive to the relative weight for waiting time. If we reduce the 
relative importance of waiting time in calculating generalized cost, then travelers 
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in the corridor experience savings of 11.1 percent. If we increase the importance 
of waiting time, then the benefits accrued from iXpress are reduced to approxi-
mately 8.3 percent in the corridor. This is logical as the introduction of iXpress has 
the least impact on waiting times in this corridor. 
Varying the importance of transfer times has little effect on the net benefits 
associated with iXpress, with the generalized costs savings varying from 9.2- 9.8 
percent. Obviously, as transfer times become relatively more important, general-
ized costs savings increase. Similarly, the magnitude of corridor savings increases 
with increased of value of time, but only marginally. If we assume travelers have 
very low value of time, then the travel cost savings falls from the initial value of 9.5 
percent to approximately 8.7 percent. Under the assumption of high value of time, 
$12.00 per hour, then the travel cost savings increase to 9.8 percent.
iXpress Service Performance and Upgrade Plans
During the planning of iXpress, Grand River Transit forecasted ridership projec-
tions for several periods: immediately after service initiation, at the time when all 
supporting technologies for iXpress had been implemented, and one year after 
this full implementation. These BRT technologies include transit signal priority 
(TSP) along its corridor, AVLS to support real time arrival information at all loca-
tions, a web-based trip planner, and an interactive voice response (IVR) system 
to provide passenger information. At the time of the most recent data collection, 
several delays had precluded the full implementation of these technologies. Table 
9 summarizes how ridership (average weekday boardings) forecasts compare with 
actual ridership.
Table 9. Projected and Actual Ridership Values
 
Based on the success of the iXpress, the Region has undertaken an Environmental 
Assessment to determine the feasibility and optimal design of an upgraded, rapid 
transit system which will be operated on longitudinally separated right of way. The 
process is ongoing, with final approval slated for 2009.
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Conclusions
This paper presents a methodology to assess the impacts of express bus service in 
areas with existing transit service. The method presented is based on utility theory, 
the traditional model used in mode choice models. However, the application in 
this case is done for individual origin-destination pairs in three corridors such 
that micro-level generalized cost components (waiting time, in-vehicle time, and 
transfer times) can be readily computed before and after the introduction of the 
express service. We find cost savings for individual O-D pairs that range from 0% 
(local service remaining the best option) to as high as 33 percent.
Next, using survey data that provide travel volumes between O-D pairs, we 
aggregate the O-D cost savings to a corridor-wide average travel cost savings for 
the highest ridership area. We calculate an average travel cost savings of approxi-
mately 9.5 percent for all riders as a result of the iXpress. The benefits of computing 
this corridor-wide cost reduction is that corridor elasticity can now be computed 
based only on the changes of boardings in the corridor, rather than a change in 
O-D volumes. When combined with an increase in demand in the corridor of 
12.3 percent, this cost reduction suggests an observed elasticity of demand with 
respect to price of 1.3.
Finally, we test the sensitivity of our travel cost savings to the assumed weights of 
waiting time and transfer time, as well as value of travel time. All of these variables 
display the expected relationships: travel costs savings decrease as waiting time 
becomes more important (because the express service contributes little to wait-
ing time savings); travel costs savings increase with transfer times becoming more 
important, and with increasing value of time. The magnitude of each of these 
changes suggests that the model is largely insensitive to these parameter values.
Endnotes
1 Many Canadian metropolitan areas have so-called Regional governments that, 
in essence, act as a bridge between Provincial and municipal governance. The 
Regional Municipality of Waterloo has legal responsibility to develop a Regional 
Official Plan which is consistent with the Province in its strategic planning goals, 
and sets the objectives for municipal plans. The Region also operates Grand River 
Transit, the region’s transit service.
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Abstract
This work is a report on research concerning transit service characteristics as seen 
from the users’ point of view. Users of two separate bus lines, operating in a shared/
common urban infrastructure, were interviewed at bus stops about their perception 
concerning headways of bus lines operation. An analysis was made regarding devia-
tions between actual and scheduled bus arrival headway. Further statistical analysis 
was carried out to check factors giving rise to different perceptions. The operation 
of each bus line was registered, and corresponding service characteristics were com-
pared with those perceived by the users. Based on these results, a model for bus line 
headways was proposed, incorporating the perception of deviations by the users. In 
conclusion, a reliable service, meaning smaller deviations, is more appreciated by the 
public than any service of shorter headways and less reliability.
Introduction
In recent studies regarding travel time and reliability, it has been found that 
travelers are not only interested in saving travel time but also in reducing travel 
time variability. Their attitudes and “choice of way and route” strongly depend 
on this perception. Variability causes uncertainty, as they do not know arrival 
time at the destination. Thus, variability is considered by travelers as an additional 
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cost.  Research is rather limited on demand-and-supply variation effects on travel 
time reliability in an uncertain environment. For example, a recent report was 
examined how individual travelers with different risk-taking attitudes responded 
to such changes (Chen et al. 2001). Route choice models that were originally 
proposed were based on the assumption that all travelers are aware of the travel 
times of a certain network (deterministic models [Beckmann et al. 1956] as well as 
stochastic models [Daganzo amd Sheffi 1977; Fisk 1980; Sheffi and Powell 1982]). 
However, both categories of models tend to disregard network uncertainty (sto-
chasticity) and assume that the network is deterministic, an assumption that is 
not true, especially during rush hours. 
This paper, based on a recent university study (Daskalakis 2002), focuses on how 
passengers perceive reliability of bus line operation, and models the relationship 
between bus line operation characteristics and this perceived measure of reliability.
Travel Time Perception and Evaluation by Passengers
Travel time is a natural measure of the effectiveness of a bus service. The purpose 
of bus service is to transport people to their destination with safety and conve-
nience, offering easy access and providing service information. However, most 
people rate travel speed and, consequently, travel time above all quality character-
istics (Chen et al. 2002). This time often varies considerably, primarily during rush 
hours in everyday commuting. 
Waiting time deviation is an indicator of how passengers experience the operation 
of a bus line, while waiting at the same stop, around the same period of the day, 
when headway schedules are the same. Studies concerning time cost have shown 
that passengers would rather wait than pay for a more frequent service, though 
not for long (Hess et al. 2003). Bus operators aim at offering services that best suit 
passenger needs. Does this mean they have to provide more frequent bus sched-
ules, which is something evidently expensive, or is there any other way of keeping 
passengers sufficiently satisfied while waiting for the bus?  The answer should be 
regular bus transportation, leading to an increased quality of service. 
Collection and Analysis of Data
To acquire data that would assist in this evaluation of user perception of bus 
schedule variability, a survey was conducted downtown Athens, Greece. Frequen-
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cies of bus lines were registered on site and were compared to the original sched-
uled frequencies by OASA (Athens Urban Transportation Organization). 
Two lines were selected: line A and line B (originally code named “A14” and “730”), 
linking central Athens to western suburban districts. The survey was carried out 
from May to June (on usual weekdays, primarily Tuesdays and Thursdays) from 
07:00 to 17:00, covering both morning and afternoon commuting. More specifi-
cally, the time period 07:00- 09:30 was chosen to cover traveling to work from the 
suburbs to central Athens. This period was called the inbound direction “I.” The 
period 13:45-16:45 was chosen primarily for passengers returning to their homes, 
following the outbound (“O”) direction. It is noted that, during the days and the 
times of the interviews, weather conditions were normal, no major events affected 
the usual operation of bus lines, and the interviewed passengers were chosen ran-
domly. These two bus lines are operated by ETHEL (an OASA partner, responsible 
for operating thermal buses). Both are radial-shaped, linking the commercial cen-
ter of Athens with suburban districts and run along signalized arterials (see Tables 
1 and 2). By the time of the research, schedule information was not posted at bus 
stops. Passengers had to find out the scheduled bus line frequency usually by ask-
ing bus drivers. For survey needs, such data were derived from original scheduling 
timetables of OASA. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Surveyed Bus Lines 
  Line A    Line B
 Inbound (I)  Outbound (O)  Inbound (I)  Outbound (O)
Route length (m) 7631  7270  7555  7097
No. of stops 27  26  25  26
Average length 
293  280  302  273
 
between stops (m)
Scheduled round   85    80 trip time (min)    
Source: Athens Urban Transportation Organization 
Table 2. Scheduled and Observed (Mean) Bus Headways 
 Line  A   B
 Direction I  O I  O
Scheduled time (min) 7.9  6.9 17.0  16.0
Mean observed time (min) 8.2  7.7 21.0  16.6
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Basic questions asked were the following:
1) How often do you use this particular bus line (weekdays)? (daily—4+ days 
a week, 2-3 times a week, 1-2 times a month, less than once a month)
2) In your opinion, what is the usual delay? (no delay, considerable, much, 
too much) (i.e., magnitude of the delay)
3) In your usual schedule, how long would you be willing to wait for the bus? 
(0, 5, 15, 20, 20+ min)
4) From your experience, how long (in minutes) is the usual bus latency? (0, 
5, 15, 20, 20+ min) 
5) How long do you usually wait at the bus stop before concluding that the 
bus is late? (0, 5, 15, 20, 20+ min) 
6) How long (in minutes) would you be prepared to wait for the bus? (0, 5, 
15, 20, 20+ min) 
7) You arrive at the bus stop. When would you decide that your schedule has 
been seriously affected? (0, 5, 15, 20, 20+ min) 
8) What is the purpose of the particular trip? (work, returning home, educa-
tion, shopping, recreation, other)
9) After how long (in minutes) would you consider the delay unjustified?
10) Suppose that the exact arrival time is indicated at the bus stop. How would 
you describe a bus delay of   
 a) 5 minutes? (short, average, long, unacceptable)       
b) 10 minutes? (short, average, long, unacceptable) 
A total of 300 valid questionnaires were collected. The resulting data were sub-
jected to a series of statistical tests and analysis.
T-tests were conducted for each travelling direction with regard to different 
expressions of waiting time perception, as addressed in questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 
10. Table 3 shows the statistical results for the means, standard deviations and the 
significance levels for the null hypothesis H0 of equal means.
No assumption of equal means, except that for question 5, was found to be sta-
tistically significant with a confidence coefficient in excess of (1-)5 = 95%, since 
all t-statistics were over 0.05. Homogeneity of variance test was performed by 
calculating Levene’s statistic to verify the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
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that would certify the performance of further tests, such as ANOVA and Dis-
criminate Analysis. Levene’s test is an alternative to Bartlett test (Bartlett 1937), 
testing also observations originating from populations showing the same variance 
that depend heavily on the assumption that these observations refer to normal 
distributions. Since in our case is that no such evidence exists, Levene’s test was 
considered as preferable. 
Regarding questions 6 and 10, the test confirmed heteroscedasticity with confi-
dence coefficient (1-)6,10 = 99.8%. That is, the hypothesis that waiting time (as 
specified in questions 6 and 10) is of equal levels of variance for both directions “I” 
and “O” is not accepted. Consequently, the answers to questions 6 and 10 do not 
explain the same proportion of the variance by direction. 
Table 3. Statistical Results (t-test) 
Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
30
Results of the t-tests for the rest of the questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 did not indicate 
significant differences concerning the means of the given answers for a confidence 
coefficient (1-)3,4,6,7,9 >90%, and no definite conclusion may be drawn about the 
effect on the answers of any of the two directions. In question 10, for a waiting 
time of 5 minutes, the mean value of the answers given by the passengers of direc-
tion “O” is greater than that of direction “I” with a confidence coefficient of (1-)10 
= 95%. It should be noted that the ordinal scale of question 10 was transformed 
to a numerical, using the following convention: small = 1, medium = 2, large = 3, 
unacceptable = 4.
Similar tests were performed for each line separately, combining the two direc-
tions. Relevant results are shown in Table 4. All the differences of the means for 
the two bus lines, except that of question 7, are statistically significant with a 
confidence coefficient (1- )3,4,5,6,9,10(5) >95%. In questions 5, 6 and 10, Levene’s test 
gives  <0.05, which reveals heteroscedasticity. That is, the null hypothesis that 
the variable (waiting time as specified in questions 5, 6 and 10) has equal levels for 
both bus lines A and B does not hold and the variance cannot be explained at the 
same degree. 
There is also a direct correspondence between the answers given by passengers to 
questions 3, 4 and 9 and the type of bus line. In particular, passengers of bus line A 
stated at the above questions significantly (with a confidence coefficient (1-)3,4,9 
>99%) shorter mean time. 
The mean (waiting time) based on the samples answering questions 5 and 6 for 
bus line A is shorter than waiting time of bus line B. However, existence of het-
eroscedasticity in the sample does not allow concluding that the type of bus line 
is a significant factor. In question 10 (a), mean waiting time in the case of bus line B 
is longer than that of line A, indicating less tolerance by the users as long as waiting 
is concerned. In question 7, bus line type does not affect the answers. 
In contrast to passengers of line B, passengers of line A spend everyday shorter 
waiting time at the bus stop. It appears from the answers, that passengers perceive 
scheduled headway of each bus line rather accurately, even if they do not have 
direct information about it. They evaluate the degree of schedule adherence and 
adapt their own trip schedule to the mean headway for each line. The time they 
are prepared to wait at the bus stop is not related to the mean headway of the 
bus line. Deviations between actual bus lines operation and scheduled headways 
create problems and affect their activities.  In cases where these activities require 
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a precise schedule, passengers begin to consider alternative bus lines, taxi service, 
a combination both, or even walking.
Usually, after carrying out a test of statistical importance, it is desirable to know 
which factor contributed to the results. In our case, we pay special attention to the 
differences between the answers. Analysis can, of course, be limited to the simple 
t-tests, in order to compare all possible pairs of the sample means. However, such 
a procedure would depend on chance. 
Post hoc comparison techniques, on the other hand, take into account specifically 
the fact that more than two sample means may be examined. Post hoc stands for 
the logical error of believing that temporal succession implies a relation. These 
post hoc comparisons were made using Scheffé’s and Duncan’s tests. Scheffé’s 
test performs simultaneous joint comparisons in pairs for all possible combina-
tions of means in pairs using the F sampling distribution. This test is considered to 
be “conservative” (Clarke and Cooke 1998); therefore, its usage helps to find out 
significant (at a level a = 0.05) errors occurring in multiple comparisons.
Table 4. Combined (Inbound-Outbound) Statistical Results (t-test)
 
Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
32
At the same time, there is a chance that important differences, possibly existing, 
may not occur. To limit this possibility, a more tolerant test (Duncan) is performed. 
Duncan’s test makes comparisons in pairs using a stepwise order of comparison, 
setting a protection level for the rate of error regarding the collection of data sets, 
rather than rate of error for individual tests.
Tests mentioned above made it clear that a significant factor differentiating the 
answers is the headway of each bus line. To find a quantitative expression (func-
tion) of that differentiation, Discriminant Analysis was used. This type of analysis 
describes the differentiating features from observing known populations and tries 
to find “discriminants” of which numerical values are such that the observations 
(responses) are as distinct as possible (Fisher 1936).
Responses to questions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 were treated as quantitative variables. 
Analysis indicates that 57-74 percent of the answers at the basis of bus lines A 
and B with confidence coefficient of (1-)3,4,5,6,9 >95% . Wilk’s Lambda found to be 
ranging between 0.78 and 0.88, depending on the type of question. Wilk’s Lambda 
([0,1]) is a multivariate test of significance, sometimes called the U-statistic, with 
values close to 0 indicating that the group means are different and values close to 
1 indicating the group means are not different.
The most felicitous analysis was found to be the one referring to question 3 (“In 
your usual schedule, how long do you estimate you will be willing to wait for the 
bus?”), in which the discriminant percentage of the questions was 74 percent, 
with Wilk’s Lambda 0.78 with a confidence coefficient of (1-)3 >99%. The linear 
discriminant function for each of the two bus lines was:
Bus line A:  y3,A =  -4.415 + 0.661x (1)
Bus line B:  y3,B =  -7.878 + 0.918x (2) 
where: y is  the classification variable of bus line
 x is  answer to the question no.3, in minutes
 
For a specific x, the larger of the two classification variables y3,A, y3,B classifies the 
user to the one or the other bus line. The discriminant line is made up by the parts 
of the two functions that give higher scores before and after the point of intersec-
tion (dashed line, Figure 1). The two lines intersect at a point with an abscissa equal 
to 13.45 min. Thus, a user whose response is less than 13.45, is more likely to use 
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line A. Users of line A, compared to those of line B, spend less of their time at the 
bus stop. This indicates that the users of the more frequent line A perceive their 
waiting time through the assumption that line A has a higher headway. Passengers 
of line B, on the contrary have a better perception of the actual headway of the 
particular line.
Figure 1.  Bus Line A & B Discriminant Functions
Results of previous test-controls are summarized as follows: 
•	 Passengers	of	both	lines	in	the	outbound	direction,	that	is,	those	mainly	
returning home in the afternoon, answered that they are less tolerant 
compared to answers given to the same question while making the morn-
ing inbound trip. For passengers returning home, the reliability of service is 
evaluated (perceived) as more important than is in the inbound trip.
•	 Headway	analysis	showed	a	large	degree	of	schedule	deviation	(up	to	90%	
–95%). This implies about ±7.5 minutes for line A and ±16.5 minutes for B 
(extreme negative signs indicate a bunching). Passengers perceived average 
times of: 10.7 and 14 minutes, respectively. Passengers of the most frequent 
line (A) perceive greater delays than actual ones, while passengers of the less 
frequent line (B) perceive smaller schedule deviations than actual ones. This 
phenomenon is known as “time drag,” in which waiting time seems longer 
than it actually is (Moreau 1992). A possible explanation for this would be 
that the perception of time from an unreliable bus service follows a loga-
rithmic trend (i.e. during the first waiting minutes, time “runs” faster).
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Model Proposal and Development
To investigate further the claim of the logarithmic-like relationship as suggested in 
the previous chapter, the following simple calculations were undertaken. The basic 
relationship is expressed as follows: 
Ti = ki Hi
L (3)
where: Ti : the users’ perception of deviation as stated in the interview for bus line 
i.
 H
i
 : headway of bus line i
ki :  coefficient of proportion, independent of the bus line’s headway,  
related to bus line i user’s characteristic, the purpose of traveling, 
the  
frequency of bus usage, travel time, etc. 
 L :  unknown numerical variable
For bus line , eq(3) becomes:  TA = kA HAL and for bus line , eq(3) becomes: 
TB = kB HB
L
In our case, users of bus lines  and  have similar characteristics (purpose of 
travelling, frequency of bus usage, etc) and this means  kA= kB
 
(4)
 Observed HA=7.68min and HB=17.65min. TA and TB can be derived from the 
answers collected in the survey and refer to the perception of schedule deviation 
of bus lines A and B, respectively. 
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By substituting in (4) HA, HB and the values given in question no.3 (Table 4), i.e. 
TA=11.27 and TB=15.66:
 
(5)
 
And finally:
T=kH2/5    T, H in min (6) 
The above model was iteratively fitted to the survey responses, i.e. the values of the 
responses to those questions that combine on the same basis, passenger percep-
tion with actual bus line performance. These are questions no. 3,4 and 5 (Table 4). 
Coefficient of proportion k for passengers of bus lines A and B is then derived as 
the minimum square root error solution to (6), using the survey data for each pair 
of Tquest no.(3),(4),(5)(A),(B) and H(A),(B). 
The resultant form of the model is then:
T(H) = 4.7H2/5    T, H in min             (7)
The rate of T vs. H, r(h)  derives from:
 (8)
H in min, r in min(-3/5)
where: r(H) is a decaying function of H, signifying the diminishing impact of a  
 headway increase on the perception of schedule deviation. 
The plotted results of the (7) and (8) are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Perceived Deviation and its Rate of Change vs. Headway 
(Factors 4.7, 1.88 concern users of specific bus lines A & B as described above)
Conclusions
Bus line users traveling in stochastic transportation networks, having little knowl-
edge of the exact schedule timetables, usually base their travel decisions on the 
empirical perception of time in order to organize their own time schedules. The 
perception of the mean waiting time and its variances determines how service 
reliability is evaluated by the user and, subsequently, the user’s attitude towards 
the way of traveling. Knowing the way passengers perceive schedule deviations 
and the resultant variations of their waiting time would help the management of 
transportation in achieving operational effectiveness. Having interviewed passen-
gers waiting at bus stops, it was verified that a (the) significant factor related to the 
perception of waiting time deviations was the headway, yet not linearly. 
On the basis of the proposed model, deviation is perceived as a function of the 
headway H raised to the number of 2/5. The curve expressing the relation between 
perceived deviation (leading to the so-called “time drag”) and headway has a loga-
rithmic shape, while the curve expressing the rate of the perception of deviation 
has that of a negative exponential. The greater the headway, the greater deviation 
the users perceive, but at a diminishing rate. So, if an operator wishes to upgrade 
the quality of those services related to passenger waiting time, it is important to 
keep bus lines even with greater headways reliable and then try to achieve shorter 
headways. Once a bus line with shorter headway is in operation, it should be 
strictly reliable, as passengers become indignant about unreliability of bus lines 
with shorter headways.
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Limitations and Future Work
Natural limitations in this research concern the basic sample of only two specific 
bus lines, the fact that bus operators may have incorporated some manual head-
way control into schedules—a thing unknown to us, and that passengers had no 
credible source available of information about bus line scheduled operations. By 
implementing intelligent transport systems such as real-time information at bus 
stops and automatic headway control methods, new and challenging conditions 
appear in transportation environment. 
Suggestions for further investigation on the subject could involve research on dif-
ferent types of bus lines and networks, such as peripheral instead of radical bus 
lines or bus lines using exclusive lanes. The question of how reliable (in quantita-
tive terms) a service should be before it is made more frequent, regarding cost and 
benefits of alternative operational strategies, is also another interesting direction 
of research.
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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of Virginia’s policy of exempting hybrid-electric vehi-
cles from minimum occupancy requirements on state HOV lanes. Virginia registra-
tion statistics are used to compile hybrid market shares on a county level to compare 
the impact of HOV lane access to other socioeconomic variables. The HOV incentive 
is shown to have a significant impact in Northern Virginia, but not in the Hampton 
Roads area. The paper also addresses the criticisms and potential unintended conse-
quences of the incentive policy, including whether it has impacted the “green” image 
of the hybrid in Virginia.
Introduction
This article examines the impact of HOV lane exemption policies for hybrid-elec-
tric vehicles, focusing primarily on the state of Virginia. Sales and general interest 
in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) has risen steadily in recent years in response to 
rising fuel costs and increased concern about pollution and greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Hybrid vehicles utilize the same gasoline fuel infrastructure as conventional 
Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles, yet represent a distinct technology 
improvement that can provide greater fuel economy and reduced emissions for 
equivalent vehicle performance by recapturing energy normally lost during break-
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ing (U.S. Department of Energy 2007). As an energy efficiency technology, HEVs 
also address positive externalities associated with resource management, the 
environment, and energy security, which are not taken into account by the market 
(Jaffe and Stavins 1994). In addition, HEVs face barriers to diffusion that are com-
mon to many new cost-saving technologies, such as high initial unit costs, lack of 
knowledge by potential adopters, high discount rates for future cost savings, and 
low consumer risk tolerance (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Stoneman and Diederen 1994; 
Argote and Epple 1990). To account for these externalities and barriers to adop-
tion, the U.S. Federal Government and many state governments have offered a 
variety of incentives and privileges to consumers who purchase hybrids and alter-
native fuel vehicles (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), one of the most notable 
being an exemptions from minimum vehicle occupancy requirements in High 
Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) carpool lanes. This privilege can result in considerable 
time savings for commuters who purchase hybrids.
Where HOV lanes exist and have sufficient excess capacity, allowing hybrids or 
alternative fuel vehicles on HOV lanes with a single occupant provides a means of 
promoting adoption with almost no direct marginal costs to taxpayers, other than 
the cost of publicizing, administering, and enforcing the program. Virginia was the 
first state to adopt this policy, starting in 2000, and since 2005 several other states, 
including Florida, Georgia, Utah, New York, New Jersey, California and Arizona, 
have allowed hybrids on at least some of the state’s HOV lanes (U.S. Department 
of Energy 2007). Due to its seven-year history of allowing hybrids on HOV lanes, 
Virginia provides an excellent case study of the impact of HOV incentive policies 
for hybrids and may provide insights for other jurisdictions considering similar 
policy incentives. To that end, this paper examines the background of Virginia’s 
HOV lane incentive and its impact on local adoption patterns. It compares the 
impact of Virginia’s HOV lane policy to other potential determinants of hybrid 
vehicle adoption, including income, environmentalism, and commuting charac-
teristics. Additionally, it looks at the potential for unintended consequences of the 
policy and whether there is evidence that HOV incentives have led to a backlash 
against the “green” image of hybrids in Virginia.
This paper builds on previous research into the determinants of hybrid vehicle 
adoption. Kahn (2007) found that environmentalism (as indicated by Green Party 
affiliation) was associated with hybrid ownership, based on regression analysis 
of census track-level data in six California cities. Heffner et al. (2005) conducted 
detailed interviews with households in Northern California that own HEVs and 
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determined that both anticipated cost savings and the “green image” of hybrids 
influence purchase decisions. McManus and Berman (2005) analyzed the results 
of an online survey taken by 532 hybrid owners and 933 potential owners who 
visited the HEV information website HybridCars.com. Their report identified the 
desire to save money on gas and reduce pollution as significant motivating factors 
for purchasing a hybrid among both sets of respondents. A 2004 marketing survey 
by ChangeWave Research concluded that hybrid owners tend to be in the highest 
income demographics and are more sensitive to gas prices than environmental 
benefits in purchasing their vehicles (ChangeWave Research 2005). 
Several more recent studies on hybrid vehicle adoption that also examine the 
impact of government incentives have been conducted using sales and registra-
tion data for U.S. states. Diamond (2008) conducted cross-sectional regressions 
of annual state market share for top-selling hybrid models using RL Polk registra-
tion data. The analysis found that average gasoline prices, income, miles traveled, 
and environmentalism were all positively related to market share, but that the 
presence or values of monetary incentives at the state level was generally weak or 
insignificant compared to these other factors. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008) 
analyzed actual sales transaction data provided by JD Power and found a more sig-
nificant impact from state incentives. However, both studies noted that sales tax 
waivers tended to be more significant than income tax credits, and that Virginia’s 
HOV incentive appeared to have significantly impacted market share. This paper 
further contributes to the literature on incentive policies for hybrids by examin-
ing the impact of Virginia’s HOV policy at the local level. It makes use of market 
share calculations for individual Virginia cities and counties to explore how the 
impact of the HOV incentive on hybrid adoption varied among different jurisdic-
tions within the state, taking into account local variations in other factors such as 
income, environmentalism, and commuting habits. 
Virginia HOV System Background
Virginia’s incentive policy stems from a law predating the introduction of hybrids, 
which authorized the HOV lane exemption for a variety of alternative fuel vehicles. 
When hybrids were first introduced in the U.S. in 2000, the state Department 
of Motor Vehicles—under pressure from consumers and lawmakers—allowed 
hybrids (which run on gasoline and are therefore not technically alternative fuel 
vehicles) to also qualify for the program (Morrison and Counts 2005). Access to 
HOV lanes is controlled by issuing hybrids and other alternative fuel vehicles a 
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“special clean fuel” license plate, which can be seen by police enforcing HOV rules. 
These plates provide single-occupant access to HOV lanes in two major areas: 
Northern Virginia, which boarders Washington, DC, and the Hampton Roads 
area, which includes Newport News, Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Virginia Beach. 
The Northern Virginia HOV lanes include three major highways—along Inter-
state Route 66 (I-66), the Dulles Toll Road (VA 267) and Interstate Route 95/395 
(I-95/395).1 The law authorizing the exemption originally contained a two-year 
sunset clause, but until 2006 it was renewed for two additional years each time it 
had been set to expire. In 2006, lawmakers renewed the exemption for only one 
additional year, but ended single-occupant access for hybrids purchased after June 
30, 2006, on the I- 95/395 HOV lanes in response to concerns about overcrowding. 
In 2007 and 2008, the law was extended only on an annual basis; it is currently set 
to expire on June 30, 2009 (Virginia Department of Transportation 2008).
The map in Figure 1 shows the general locations of the Hampton Roads and 
Northern Virginia HOV networks. The map in Figure 2 shows the highways that 
make up the Northern Virginia HOV network. 
On VA 267 and Interstate 66 (outside of I-495), HOV lanes consist of the left-
most highway lane in each direction and are not physically separated from the 
rest of the highway. During the morning rush hours, these lanes are restricted to 
HOV-2 (two or more occupants required) in the inbound direction, switching to 
HOV-2 outbound during the evening rush hour. Along I-66 between I-495 and 
the Washington, DC border, the entire highway is restricted to HOV-2 inbound 
in the morning (with non-HOV traffic permitted outbound only), and HOV-2 
only for all outbound traffic in the afternoon (with non-HOV traffic permitted 
inbound). The most extensive HOV lane network is the 27-mile segment along 
Interstate I-95/395. The I-95/395 HOV lanes consist of a reversible two-lane seg-
ment that is separated from the main highway with limited access points, open 
to inbound (northbound towards Washington, DC) traffic in the morning and 
outbound traffic in the evening. Traffic is restricted to HOV-3 (three or more 
passengers required) during the morning and evening rush hours. Of these three 
HOV systems, the I-95/395 HOV lanes handle the most traffic and offer the most 
significant percentage time savings (approximately 50%) compared to non-HOV 
traffic (Morrison and Counts 2005). Hampton Roads has HOV lanes on several of 
the main highways, but time savings and traffic volume on the HOV network are 
much lower than in Northern Virginia (The Marketing Source 2002).
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Figure 1. Virginia HOV lanes
Figure 2. Northern Virginia HOV Lanes
Criticism and Unintended Consequences
Since its inception, Virginia’s HOV exemption rule for hybrids has been the subject 
of considerable debate. Originally, the practice was in violation of Federal highway 
regulations for HOV lanes on interstate highways, which mandated that HOV 
lanes were only for high occupancy vehicles (Federal Highway Adminsitration 
2005). This debate was ended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which authorized 
states to allow HOV exemptions for hybrids and other clean fuel vehicles. How-
ever, critics in newspaper editorials, opinion pieces, and internet discussion boards 
point out that the incentive policy runs counter to other policies designed to 
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promote energy efficient practices such as carpooling and the use of mass transit 
(Ginsberg 2006). Some of the most vehement criticism of hybrid HOV drivers 
is found on discussion boards devoted to carpooling and ridesharing. One such 
message board, Slug-Line.com, contains over 2,800 mostly negative postings in 88 
separate threads devoted to hybrids in the HOV lanes, with topics such as “hybrid 
hate,” “anti-hybrid road rage,” and “tired of choking on hybrid fumes.”2 
One common complaint by critics is that single-occupant hybrid commuters in 
HOV lanes actually consume more gasoline per mile, on average, than carpool-
ers in less efficient vehicles with two or three passengers (Kuehnel 2006). By this 
criterion, hybrids would have to achieve a fuel economy of over 60 mpg to justify 
access to the HOV lanes that normally require two vehicle occupants, based on 
an average fuel economy of 29.5 mpg for passenger automobiles in 2006 (National 
Highway Transit Safety Administration 2006). This comparison may be partially 
valid, but the broader environmental impact of the policy is more difficult to 
determine and depends both on the percentage of hybrid drivers who would have 
commuted alone in the non-HOV lanes otherwise and the extent to which solo 
hybrid commuters also use their hybrids for non-commuting trips on evenings 
and weekends in place of less fuel efficient vehicles. Virginia has not conducted 
sufficient survey research to determine whether hybrid ownership has directly 
impacted carpooling or mass transit ridership in Virginia. However, a 2005 Virginia 
Department of Transportation Study concluded that hybrids accounted for 19 
percent of traffic on the I-95 HOV corridor during the morning rush hour, and 
that this additional traffic had pushed the HOV lanes beyond their design capacity 
(Morrison and Counts 2005). It is likely that such increased congestion in the HOV 
lanes would serve as a disincentive to carpooling. 
There is also an equity issue, since the HOV exemption policy favors those who 
not only can afford to buy a new car but can also pay the incremental premium to 
purchase a hybrid model over an equivalent gasoline-only model. While the avail-
ability of more affordable used hybrids should increase over time, Virginia Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records in May 2007 indicated that used vehicles 
still accounted for less than 15 percent of the total number of hybrids titled.
The combination of HOV lane overcrowding and backlash by carpoolers could 
potentially promote a more negative image of hybrid owners in Virginia, as com-
pared to a generally positive image of hybrid owners in other parts of the country 
as environmentally-conscious consumers. To the extent that this phenomenon 
occurs, it may serve as a disincentive to consumers in the Northern Virginia area 
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who do not desire HOV lane access but might otherwise have considered a hybrid 
for the positive environmental or “green” image it connotes. 
The remainder of this paper addresses several basic research questions that arise 
from Virginia’s experience with its HOV lane incentive. First, it explores whether 
the HOV incentive has been effective in promoting adoption of hybrids in North-
ern Virginia and Hampton Roads and how the effect of the policy compares to 
other socioeconomic factors. Second, it explores whether there is evidence that 
the policy has tarnished the “green” image of the hybrid in Virginia.
Geographical Analysis of Virginia Adoption Patterns
Statistics on new hybrid market share (new hybrids as a percentage of all new 
vehicles registered) for all Virginia counties and independent cities were used to 
test the impact of HOV lane policies in promoting adoption compared to other 
factors. The Virginia DMV provided basic data on every hybrid registered in the 
state as of May 31, 2007, including the automobile make, model, model year, origi-
nal title date, and garaged jurisdiction (county or independent city).3 Using this 
database, the numbers of new and used hybrid vehicles titled in each county and 
independent city were calculated each year for Virginia Fiscal Years4 2001 through 
2006 (FY01-06) and for the first three quarters of FY07. The DMV also provided a 
separate data set with the total number of new and used vehicles titled each fiscal 
year for each jurisdiction, which allowed the calculation of market share. The deci-
sion to analyze market share by fiscal year was driven primarily by the way that the 
DMV provided the data on total numbers of vehicles titled for each jurisdiction. 
However, the use of fiscal year was also convenient because it corresponded nicely 
with the change in the HOV policy for I-95/395 starting on July 1, 2006.
Figures 3 and 4 show the relative market share (given as a percentage) of new 
hybrids among counties in Northern Virginia and in the entire state, respectively, 
from FY01-06.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the dramatic difference in market share between counties 
adjacent to the Northern Virginia HOV lanes from those in the rest of the state. 
Stafford County, which includes the southern terminus of the I-95 HOV lanes, had 
the highest market share in the state for each individual year and for the combined 
period from FY01 through FY06. In FY06 (the year before the I-95/395 exemption 
ended), almost 6 percent of all new car registrations for Stafford County were for 
hybrid vehicles. Presumably, the high hybrid market shares in Northern Virginia 
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Figure 3. Hybrid (HEV) Market Share Percentages 
in Northern Virginia, FY01-06
Figure 4. Hybrid (HEV) Market Share Percentages 
in Virginia Counties, FY01-06
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are directly related to the time-savings value of the HOV exemption for com-
muters in these counties. The impressive market share in the Northern Virginia 
HOV corridors is in sharp contrast to lackluster market share in the remainder of 
the state. Despite the apparent impact of the HOV incentive policy in Northern 
Virginia, there is little graphical evidence that the policy impacted market share in 
the Hampton Roads area. This apparent discrepancy will be discussed further in 
the following sections. 
It is important to note that the market share is based on new hybrids as a percent-
age of new vehicles, so this comparison already takes into account the fact that 
consumers in more affluent counties or cities are more likely to purchase new cars 
(versus used cars) than in less affluent jurisdictions. Figure 5 shows a geographical 
representation of market share percentages after correcting for income (dividing 
the market share by median county income), illustrating that the high market 
share for hybrids along the I-95/395 and I-66 HOV corridors is not strictly a func-
tion of higher consumer income in Northern Virginia.
Figure 5. Hybrid (HEV) Market Share Normalized by Income, FY01-06
Another indication of the impact of the I-95/395 HOV exemption is the change in 
hybrid sales patterns in Northern Virginia after the exemption ended for hybrids 
purchased after June 30, 2006. Market share for the first nine months of FY07 
dropped dramatically in Stafford and Prince William counties compared to FY06. 
The relative ratios of FY07 to FY06 sales in Virginia counties and cities are shown 
in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Ratios of FY07 to FY06 Hybrid (HEV) Sales
Regression Analysis of Virginia Cities and Counties
The significance of the HOV lane incentive compared to other socioeconomic deter-
minants was explored further via cross-sectional regressions of annual market share 
of Virginia counties and independent cities. The basis for this cross-sectional meth-
odology is described in Diamond (2008), where it is used to test for the significance 
of incentives using state aggregate market share. The significance of the presence of 
or close proximity to an HOV lane was tested, along with several other demographic 
variables for each county or city, using the following model specification:
 
This specification is extremely basic due to the limited amount of control data 
available at the local level. The percentage of votes for Green Party presidential 
candidate Ralph Nader in the 2000 presidential election was chosen as a proxy 
for environmentalism in the absence of a more direct local proxy such as the 
Green Planning Capacity Index used by Diamond (2008) or per-capita Sierra Club 
memberships used by Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008). However, the choice of 
Green Party votes is consistent with Kahn (2007), who uses Green Party registra-
tion percentages as a proxy for environmentalism. Because Virginia does not track 
individual party membership, actual election results were used instead.5 
Mean commute time served as a proxy for relative commute distance, under the 
assumption that a further commute would provide a greater incentive to pur-
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chase a more fuel-efficient vehicle. Actual survey data on commute distance was 
not available at the county and city level for Virginia. While commute time proved 
significant in the regression, congestion may artificially inflate commute time for a 
given distance in urban areas. 
Average gas prices proved significant at predicting hybrid market share at the state 
levels in previous studies (Diamond 2008; Gallagher and Muehlegger 2008), but it 
was difficult to incorporate gas prices into the Virginia analysis. Detailed historical 
average gas prices at the Virginia county and city levels were not readily available, 
although several services, such as Gasbuddy.com and VAgasprices.com, provide 
daily price data from a selection of gas stations within each locality. A county-level 
plot of daily gasoline prices from Gasbuddy.com on June 6, 2007, showed that 
average county gas prices varied between $2.82 and $3.11, with a standard devia-
tion of only 4.5 cents per gallon (Gasbuddy 2007). However, variations between 
individual stations in the same county were almost as much as variations between 
county averages. In one attempt to use the June 6 county gas prices as a control, 
prices were statistically significant in some years, but with a negligible (and, in 
some cases, negative) effect.6
Table 1 provides a description of the variables and data sources. 
Table 1. Description of Variables for Virginia Hybrid Analysis
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Table 2 provides a summary of the data used for each variable.
Table 2. Summary of Variables for Virginia Hybrid Analysis
In FY07, the HOV dummy variable for Northern Virginia was adjusted to remove 
counties containing or adjacent to the I-95/395 HOV lanes, where new hybrids 
were no longer entitled to single-occupant HOV lane access. Table 3 lists the coun-
ties represented by the HOV dummy variables.
 
Table 3. Virginia HOV Counties and Cities7
The regression was performed using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification. 
A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in STATA indicated 
significant heteroskedasticity problems for jurisdictions with higher marketshare. 
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The presence of multiple zero values in the dependent market share variables 
(indicating jurisdictions that had no hybrids titled for that fiscal year) precluded 
the use of a log or Box-Cox transformation to reduce the effect. Instead, the results 
include heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors generated in STATA for the OLS 
regression. Table 4 lists regression results for each fiscal year. 
Median household income, Green Party voting percentage, and mean commute 
time were statistically significant in explaining hybrid market share for all years 
except FY01. Of these three variables, Green Party voting percentage and house-
hold income had the strongest effects, with Beta coefficients increasing steadily 
each year from FY02 through FY06. In FY06, one standard deviation changes in 
Green Party voting percentage and household income were associated with .40 
and .33 standard deviation changes, respectively, in new hybrid market share. In 
Northern Virginia, the HOV lane incentive was significant at the p < .001 level from 
FY02 to FY06, with Beta values between .3 and .5 for each year. After the incen-
tive ended on I-95/395 in FY07, the presence of the HOV lane incentive on I-66 
and VA-267 remains significant, although the Beta value dropped substantially, to 
.17. In Hampton Roads, there was no statistically significant relationship between 
HOV lane incentives and new hybrid registration for any year, which is consistent 
with the results of the geographic plot analysis in the previous section.
The strength and significance of Green Party voting percentage as a predictor of 
market share from FY05 onward also suggests that any “hybrid backlash” that may 
have occurred in Northern Virginia was not strong enough to erase the positive 
environmental image of the hybrid statewide. To further examine whether this 
theorized backlash actually occurred in Northern Virginia, regressions of market 
share versus income, commute time, and Green Party voting percentage were 
performed only for the 17 counties in Northern Virginia that were impacted by 
the HOV lane incentive (where the original HOV_NV dummy variable was equal 
to 1). Green Party voting percentage was insignificant until FY04, when it bordered 
on significance with Beta values greater than .5. In FY07, after the elimination of 
the incentive for new hybrids on I-95/395, it became significant with a Beta value 
of .71. Thus, the trends in significance and strength of effect for the environmen-
talism proxy in Northern Virginia from FY04-FY07 are fairly consistent with the 
trends statewide from the original regression. A detailed results table for Northern 
Virginia is omitted. 
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Conclusions 
The geographic and regression analyses of hybrid registration patterns in North-
ern Virginia and Hampton Roads suggests that HOV lane incentive policies can 
significantly impact the adoption of hybrids by consumers, but only under specific 
circumstances. The geographic analysis shows that hybrid market share was high-
est along the I-95/395 corridor—where HOV lanes offer the greatest time savings 
for commuters—but less dramatic on I-66 and VA-267. Likewise, the Beta value 
for the Northern Virginia HOV dummy in the regression dropped sharply after the 
I-95/395 corridor was excluded in FY07. 
Surprisingly, the HOV incentive appears to have had no significant impact on 
hybrid vehicle market share in the Hampton Roads area. This may be due to a 
number of factors, but is most likely due to the nature of the local highway and 
HOV lane systems. While HOV lanes provide some degree of time savings in the 
Hampton Roads area, the overall traffic congestion and time saved are much less 
than on Northern Virginia highways. A 2002 study on attitudes about HOV lanes 
in the Hampton Roads area indicated that only 59 percent of Peninsula (Newport 
News and Hampton) and 76 percent of Southside (Norfolk and Virginia Beach) 
commuters felt that HOV lanes allowed commuters to reach their destinations 
faster than non-HOV lanes, compared to an almost universal appreciation of 
potential HOV time savings among Northern Virginia commuters (The Market-
ing Source 2002). Average distance traveled in the Hampton Roads HOV lanes 
was only 15 miles, compared to 25 mile HOV commutes in Northern Virginia, 
and much of the traffic congestion in Hampton Roads is actually the result of 
several narrow bridges and tunnels (none of which have HOV lanes) that connect 
neighboring counties. Additionally, the mean commute time for Hampton Roads 
HOV counties is significantly less than for Northern Virginia HOV counties—24.8 
minutes versus 33.3 minutes—providing less of an incentive for adopting any time 
savings measure in the first place (U.S.Census Bureau 2000).
The significance of control variables for income, Green Party votes, and commute 
time is consistent with the theory and previous findings that individuals who have 
higher incomes and longer commutes and are more environmentally conscious 
are more likely to become early adopters of new vehicle efficiency technologies, 
ceteris paribus. In the case of HOV lane incentives, the effect of income may be 
amplified because the value of the time savings from HOV access is proportional 
to the value or utility that individuals place on their time. Therefore, individuals 
who earn more per hour might be likely to place a greater value on the incentive. 
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The fact that Green Party voting percentage was the strongest and most signifi-
cant predictor of market share from FY05 onward statewide and still significant in 
Northern Virginia (based on the separate Northern Virginia regressions), particu-
larly in FY07, also suggests that any “hybrid backlash” that may have occurred did 
not erase the positive environmental image of the hybrid. 
Even before FY07, the relative effect of Northern Virginia HOV lane access on 
market share had begun to decrease compared to other factors, perhaps in antici-
pation of the incentive’s eventual expiration. The Beta values for the Northern 
Virginia HOV incentive peaked in FY04 then dropped each of the following years. 
Conversely, the Beta values for the coefficient of the household income variable 
increased from .21 in FY04 to .32 in FY05 and remained steady through FY07, 
while the Beta values for the Green Party voting percentage variable continued to 
increase, reaching a value of .61 by FY07.
The main findings of this research are that 1) Virginia’s HOV lane incentive appears 
to have had a significant impact on hybrid vehicle adoption in Northern Virginia, 
but not in Hampton Roads; 2) the impacts of HOV incentive policies in general 
appear to be very sensitive to local conditions and the potential for time savings 
on a particular HOV corridor; and 3) the presence of the HOV incentive did not 
appear to diminish the impact of other factors—particularly environmental con-
sciousness—on adoption of hybrid vehicles. While this paper looked specifically 
at Virginia, it is reasonable that evaluations of incentive policies in other states 
would highlight similar trade-offs between effectiveness, equity and unintended 
consequences. 
Other states have already incorporated limitations into their own HOV policies. 
California limited the total number of solo HOV access permits to 85,000 to pre-
vent overcrowding, although there is still anecdotal evidence that the policy has 
resulted in HOV lane congestion and sharply inflated prices that dealers charged 
for hybrids as the state neared the limit on permits (McKenzie 2007). Utah offers 
single passenger express lane access to all drivers willing to pay a $500 per year fee, 
but charges hybrid owners only $50 for the fee (U.S. Department of Energy 2007). 
While this may address the equity issue and help prevent any hybrid image back-
lash, it may also dampen the perceived utility of the incentive by explicitly limiting 
its value to $450 per year. Other states have qualified HOV and other incentives 
with minimum gas mileage standards or periodic impact reviews. 
Finally, an important consideration of the HOV exemption policy, compared 
to “one-time” incentives such as rebates or credits, is that it creates a small but 
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extremely vocal group of “entrenched stakeholders” —hybrid owners—who have 
a significant personal stake in continuing the policy and are likely to fight strongly 
against any attempt to discontinue it by lawmakers or state agencies. Although 
this concern is common to all incentives that offer a continuing benefit over time, 
HOV access—more so than monetary incentives—may also influences residents’ 
long-term decisions on where they live and work, encouraging choices that cannot 
be easily undone. Thus, the unique nature of the HOV incentive and the debate 
that the policy has caused in Virginia should give pause to other states considering 
similar programs. At the very least, policymakers would be wise to include feed-
back and data collection requirements into incentive legislation to help assess and 
manage the impact of incentive policies. 
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Endnotes
1 I-95 becomes I-395 between the I-495 Beltway and the Washington, DC border.
2 The term “slug line” refers to the anonymous ridesharing lines that form at sev-
eral HOV park-and-ride lots in Northern Virginia. During rush hour, single driv-
ers pick up anonymous passengers, known as “slugs,” to gain access to the HOV 
lanes.
3 The data set excluded vehicles that were purchased in Virginia but removed 
from the state prior to May 2007. This may under-report the market share values 
slightly, but it is assumed that this trend affects all counties equally and does not 
affect the comparisons of market share between counties.
4 The Virginia fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30.
5 The 2000 presidential election was chosen because of the strong Green Party 
showing (2.2% statewide) compared to other years.
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6 The negative gas price effect may be due to zone pricing strategies used by gaso-
line distributors set prices based in a manner that optimizes profits in specific 
geographic regions (Bayles 2001). While specific pricing strategies are held as 
trade secrets, prices are generally based on factors affecting demand such as 
commuting patterns and income. In the outlying Northern Virginia HOV coun-
ties where commuters have the choice of solo commuting, carpooling, or rail 
transport, prices may be kept lower to encourage automobile commuting and 
maintain demand. Since these suburban areas include the counties that benefit 
most from the HOV privileges, the zone pricing system may result in a spurious 
inverse correlation between gas prices and hybrid sales. 
7 Commute time was not provided for Alleghany County.
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Project NPV, Positive Externalities, 
Social Cost-Benefit Analysis— 
The Kansas City Light Rail Project
Sudhakar Raju, Rockhurst University
Abstract
The Heartland Light Rail project represents Kansas City’s biggest infrastructural 
investment in decades. The ballot initiative for the light rail project was voted down 
three times until it was finally approved in November 2006. Using best estimates of 
construction costs, operating expenses and federal funding, I estimate the net pres-
ent value (NPV) of the project to be negative $343 million. From a standard NPV 
perspective the Kansas City light rail transit (LRT) system is unlikely to break even. 
However, if the negative externalities of auto travel and the positive externalities 
associated with light rail are properly accounted for in a comprehensive social cost-
benefit framework, investment in the Kansas City LRT system becomes an increas-
ingly feasible option. 
Introduction
In November 2006, after several previous failed attempts, voters in Kansas City 
approved a measure for the construction of a light rail transit (LRT) system that 
would be partly financed by a 3/8-cent sales tax for 25 years. According to the offi-
cial ballot language, the plan proposes the construction of a new $1 billion, 27-mile 
Heartland Light Rail system. The plan also proposes enlarging the light rail system’s 
service area by employing a green fleet of 60 electric shuttles that would provide 
connecting transit service to nearby job and shopping centers. 
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Kansas City and Transportation
During the 1990s, Kansas City embarked on a widespread strategic planning ini-
tiative. A key recommendation of the initiative involved the city’s transportation 
system. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) data indicated that the poor 
quality of Kansas City roads imposed annual vehicle operation costs of $651 on 
Kansas City drivers1—the highest in the nation’s major cities outside California. 
Data from the 2003 national Consumer Expenditure Survey indicated that among 
major metropolitan areas, Kansas City residents spent about 20 percent of their 
budget on transportation—the fifth highest in the nation. Kansas City offers no 
real alternatives to driving and, with continued growth, transportation is pro-
jected to become even more time-consuming and costly. As a result, a key recom-
mendation of the planning initiative was for the development of a light rail transit 
system to “enhance the movement of people, to protect clean air, and to protect 
the natural environment … and the promotion of more clustered development 
along transit corridors.”2 
Kansas City is actually composed of two cities—Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas 
City, Kansas. Kansas City, Missouri is, by itself, the largest city in Missouri. The com-
bined population of the greater Kansas City metropolitan area is close to 2 million. 
Once known primarily for agriculture and manufacturing, Kansas City today has 
a diversified economic base composed of telecommunications, banking, finance, 
and service-based industries. Kansas City is also a transportation hub and a major 
national distribution center. Transportation is, therefore, central to the continued 
development of Kansas City. 
Notwithstanding the importance of transportation for Kansas City’s economic 
development, recent investment in transportation infrastructure in Kansas 
City has been poor. In a study conducted by the Mid-America Regional Council 
(MARC), a regional public policy research organization located in Kansas City, 
Kansas City ranked at the bottom of a group of peer cities in terms of public trans-
portation financing. The only public transit offered by the city is bus services. But 
even this service is underinvested; in fact, Kansas City would have to double its bus 
services to reach the average of its peer cities. 
Due to the extensive highway projects implemented in Kansas City during the 
1970s and 1980s, Kansas City possesses the most freeway lane miles per capita of 
all large urbanized areas in the United States and the fourth highest total roadway 
miles per person.3 Even though Kansas City ranks high in the number of roadway 
miles per person, its roads are in worse condition than national and peer city aver-
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ages. The Road Information Program’s (TRIP’s) 2004 Bumpy Roads Ahead report 
found that Kansas City’s “poor” pavement conditions significantly exceeded 
national averages, and Kansas City had a smaller percentage of roads classified as 
“good.” In addition, overall pavement conditions have notably deteriorated since 
2000. 
Transportation by automobile is, by far, the preferred mode of transportation in 
Kansas City, and recent studies indicate that reliance on automobiles is continuing 
to grow. More than 93 percent of all trips are by automobile, of which 83 percent 
are single-occupancy trips and 10 percent are carpool trips. About 4 percent work 
from home, 1 percent walk to work, and public transit accounts for the remaining 
1 percent.
The extensive roadway system in Kansas City offsets the excessive reliance on 
automobiles; thus, congestion is not a major problem. However, there is significant 
congestion during peak periods, and nearly all studies are in agreement that con-
gestion is growing. The 2001 Travel Time Study conducted by MARC found that 
congested travel as a percentage of peak vehicle miles traveled increased from 5 
percent in 1982 to 32 percent in 2002. However, this still compares very favorably 
to other urban areas in which congested travel increased far more substantially, 
from 24 percent in 1982 to 65 percent in 2002. The low-density urban form of Kan-
sas City means that travel distances in Kansas City are longer. The average vehicle 
miles of travel (VMT) per person in Kansas City was 28.65, whereas the average for 
metropolitan areas of similar size was 24.04 VMT per person each day.4 However, 
the relatively lower congestion in Kansas City results in greater travel speeds and 
shorter travel times. The MARC 2001 Travel Time Study found that even though 
average travel speeds steadily increased, “there are several routes where conges-
tion is an increasing problem. This is evident in that there is a large percentage of 
routes and segments with delay … and several of the most highly traveled routes in 
the region have significantly more delay than in previous studies.” A similar study 
by the Missouri Department of Transportation found that of the 10 most heavily-
congested sections of the urban Missouri interstate highways, 7 are located in 
Kansas City.5 
The Heartland Rail System 
Planning for the Kansas City LRT system began in the 1990s. The Technology Work 
Team considered six technology options—improved bus service, bus rapid transit 
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with dedicated guideway (such as in Ottawa or Curitiba), electrified bus rapid 
transit (as in Lille, France or Mexico City), electrified street car, monorail and light 
rail—and settled on light rail as the preferred technology with electric bus transit 
as a second option. 
The Heartland Rail system would serve some of Kansas City’s densest residential 
neighborhoods in the mid- and south-town areas. The proposed system align-
ment runs through downtown Kansas City, serving an employment corridor with 
250,000 jobs. The primary market that would be served by the proposed light rail 
system is work trips though strong connections to cultural and shopping centers 
would result in a strong secondary market. During peak weekday morning and 
evening periods, service is proposed to be provided every 12 minutes. 
Capital Costs, Operating Costs, and Funding for the  
Heartland Light Rail Project 
The Heartland Rail system, as proposed, would constitute one of the biggest infra-
structural investments in Kansas City history. Detailed estimates of capital costs, 
cash inflows, and cash outflows for the project is provided in the Central Business 
Corridor (CBC) Transit Plan. The essential features of the project and the underly-
ing project assumptions of the CBC Transit plan are summarized in Table 1. 
The CBC plan assumes that the project would be funded by three major sources. 
Federal funding of $593 million was assumed to cover 60.50 percent of the capital 
costs of the project. A 3/8-cent sales tax for 25 years was assumed to generate $29 
million in the first year and a total of $878 million over the 25-year tax period. The 
project would also be funded by a $195 million, 19-year, 7.70 percent bond issue, 
which would result in interest payments of $19.87 million annually. The funding 
for the project would become effective on April 1, 2009. 
The Financial Economics of the Heartland Light Rail System—
Project Analysis
While detailed estimates of capital costs, cash inflows, and cash outflows over the 
25-year life of the light rail system are provided in the Central Business Corridor 
(CBC) Transit Plan, there is no attempt to provide an economic or financial analy-
sis of the project. The project inflow and outflow estimates provided by the CBC 
plan over the 25-year life of the project are shown in Table 2.
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Table 1. Project Assumptions
 
Project Life  25 years
	 •		Capital	Period		 8	years			(Year	1	–	Year	8)
	 •		Operating	Period	 17	years	(Year	9	–	Year	25)
Estimated (Inflation Adjusted) Capital Costs $981
Base Estimate of Annual Operating/Maintenance Costs $15.20 million
Annual Growth in Operating/Maintenance Cost 4%
Annual Operating/Maintenance Cost in Year 9 $20.80 million
($15.20 x [1 + .04]8 = $20.80) 
Total Operation and Maintenance Cost (Years 9 - 25) $493
Federal Capital Funding Percentage 60.50%
Secondary Funds Base Assumption $1.50 million 
(Annual Growth Rate 1.80%)
 
Base Estimate from Sales Taxes $29 million
Estimated Annual Growth in Taxes 1.80%
Tax Period  25 years
Bond Issue  $195 million
Bond Repayment Period 19 years
Bond Interest Rate 7.50%
Annual Bond Interest Payment      
  $19.87 million
($195 million issue, Effective rate of 7.70%, 19 years)
Base Estimate of Fare Revenue (Year 9 of project) $6.11 million   
Annual Growth Rate in Fare Revenues 1.80%
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A good starting point for financial analysis is to compute the NPV of the Kansas 
City LRT project. For long-term capital projects, the Federal Transit Authority 
(FTA) recommends using a project discount rate of 7 percent.6 Using this as the 
applicable discount rate, the NPV of the project based on the CBC Transit Plan 
estimates turn out to be about $70 million. However, this NPV value is based on 
preliminary estimates provided in the CBC Transit Plan and needs to be readjusted 
in the light of recent developments and other factors such as inflationary effects. 
The most significant revisions to the preliminary estimates are:
•	 The	CBC	Transit	Plan	estimates	are	based	on	operating	cost	assumptions	of	
$20.80 million. More realistic estimates suggest that operating costs would 
probably be in the range of $25-$30 million annually. The mid-point of this 
range is used here with the assumption (as in the CBC study) that operating 
costs escalate annually at 4 percent. 
•	 The	CBC	Transit	Plan	revenue	estimates	are	based	on	a	½-cent	sales	tax	
assumption. The actual amount approved by Kansas City voters was 3/8 
cents. (Thus, actual sales tax revenues earmarked for the project are 25 
percent lower.) The lower estimate suggests that a 3/8-cent sales tax would 
generate sales tax revenues of $23 million annually. The CBC estimates were 
revised to reflect the lower sales tax with the assumption (as in the CBC 
study) that sales tax revenues increase by 1.75 percent annually.
The revised estimates are shown in Table 3. The NPV of the project based on the 
net cash flows of the project turn out to be -$53.31 million, while the Internal Rate 
of Return (IRR) is 10.58 percent7—a clear signal that the project has some inherent 
problems. 
What is clear from an analysis of the cash flow stream is that the project is heavily-
dependent on federal funding. Ironically, the only periods in which the project has 
any positive cash flow stream are the initial years—the periods when one would 
expect the project to run deficits because of high capital costs. This is due to the 
fairly high values assumed for federal funding. While capital costs reach a peak in 
years 6-8, a bond issue in Year 7 partially offsets some of these capital costs, result-
ing in a net inflow in Year 7.
The most instructive aspect of the financial analysis is the non-self sustaining 
nature of the project in the operating phase covering years 9-25. Net cash flows 
in the operating phase of the project are negative in every year of the project. In 
principle, the operating phase is somewhat less subject to uncertainty since the 
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major uncertainty in infrastructural projects tends to center around the substan-
tial initial investment costs. Four major factors determine the economic viability 
of the Heartland Light Rail project in the operating phase of the project: operating 
and maintenance costs, bond interest payments, sales tax revenues, and fare box 
revenues. The effect of each of these variables are analyzed below. 
Operating and Maintenance Costs
The budgeted value for operating and maintenance cost in the first year of the K.C. 
Light Rail project is $20.80 million. A more realistic estimate, taking into account 
factors such as cost escalation and inflation, is $25-$30 million. Using a mid-range 
estimate of operating costs, the NPV of the project, as pointed out earlier, turns 
out to be negative. Now, suppose one were to give the operating costs of the 
project more latitude. What is the lowest value that one could assume for base 
operating costs and still end up with a positive value for NPV? Holding everything 
else constant, the effect on NPV for different base year operating and maintenance 
cost assumptions is reported below.8 
Table 4. Project Sensitivity to Base Year Operating &  
Maintenance Cost Assumptions
Thus, operating and maintenance costs would have to be lower than $20.33 
million at inception of project operation for NPV to be positive. Given that the 
current estimate is $25 million, it seems unlikely that operating and maintenance 
costs could go as low as $20.33 million. In addition, if the annual percentage 
increase in operating costs were higher than 4 percent, the resulting NPV’s would 
be even more unfavorable. 
Bond Interest Payments
The base estimates are based on partial funding of the Heartland Light Rail Project 
through a $195 million, 7.70 percent effective rate, 19-year bond issue in Year 7 of 
the project. This results in interest obligations of $19.87 million over 19 years. How 
low would interest obligations have to be to result in a break-even NPV? 
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The effective interest rate assumed for the Heartland Light Rail bond issue is 7.70 
percent. Of course, future interest rates are unknown, but, based on Kansas City’s 
current credit rating, an interest rate of 7.70 percent seems reasonable and per-
haps even on the higher side. In 2007, Kansas City issued $138 million of general 
obligation “GO series 2007A” bonds at a rate of 4.60 percent. All three credit rating 
agencies—Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings—affirmed their belief 
in the City’s financial strength. In Table 5, a19-year bond issue of $195 million is 
assumed, and the effect of different interest rates and debt servicing levels on 
project NPV is computed.
Table 5. Project Sensitivity to Interest Cost Assumptions
Note: The above is based on a $195 million, 19-year bond issue.
It is clear from the sensitivity analysis above that even if long-term interest rates 
were to decline to a historical low of 4 percent, the resulting savings in debt servic-
ing costs is insufficient to result in a non-negative NPV. Since long-term interest 
rates have historically been around 7.50 percent, it is improbable for much savings 
to be realized from a decline in annual debt servicing costs alone. 
Suppose we were to consider two other options—increasing the size of the bond 
issue or increasing the maturity of the issue. It is important to recognize that size, 
maturity, and annual payments are all simultaneously determined, so that chang-
ing any one variable affects the value of at least one of the other variables. Now 
suppose that the size of the issue was increased from $195 million to some higher 
value while maturity of the issue is kept constant. What effect would this have on 
the NPV of the project? The results are reported in Table 6.
Clearly, increasing the size of the bond issue worsens the NPV of the project. This 
is due to the fact that while a larger bond issue increases the cash inflow in Year 
7, it also results in higher debt servicing burdens in the outer years of the project. 
In fact, a lower issue size may be the answer, but there may be constraints about 
running unacceptably high levels of deficits in the initial years of the project. 
69
Project NPV, Positive Externalities, Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
Table 6. Project Sensitivity to Bond Issue Size
Note: The above assumes an effective 
funding cost of 7.70 percent and a 
maturity of 19 years. 
Would increasing the maturity of the bond issue and consequently reducing the 
annual debt servicing burden improve the NPV of the project? Suppose the size 
of the issue and interest rate remained at $195 million and 7.70 percent, but the 
maturity of the issue was increased from 19 to 25 years. The annual debt servicing 
burden in this case would decrease from $19.87 million to $17.80 million over the 
life of the project, and NPV would improve from the base case NPV of -$53.31 mil-
lion to -$45 million. 
At an extreme, imagine that Kansas City could issue a perpetual bond. Suppose 
the issue size is $195 million and the interest rate is 7.70 percent. In this case, the 
annuity payments would decline from the base case estimate of $19.87 million per 
annum to perpetual annuity payments of $15.02 million ($195m x .0770). This is 
the lowest-possible annual debt servicing burden attainable by increasing bond 
maturity. However, this would still result in a negative NPV. 
The bottom line is this: Declining interest rates and consequently a lower debt 
burden would improve NPV, but even at very low interest rates the project does 
not break even. Other solutions, such as increasing the size of the bond issue or 
increasing the maturity of the bond issue, are either not helpful or do not impact 
the NPV in any substantive manner. 
Sales Tax Revenues
Initial estimates suggested a ½-cent sales tax earmarked for the Heartland Light 
Rail project. Anti-tax sentiment is, however, very strong in Kansas City, and 
the final amount approved for the light rail project by Kansas City voters was a 
3/8-cent tax for 25 years. The possibility for increasing the sales tax rate is remote; 
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the ballot language is very specific, and no significant changes can be made with-
out submitting any changes to a vote. Thus, increasing sales tax revenues to pro-
vide additional funding for the project seems unlikely. 
Fare Box Revenues 
The CBC Transit Plan assumes that fare box revenues in the first operational year 
of the project (Year 9) will be around $6.11 million and increase roughly at the rate 
of 1.76 percent annually. Demand estimates of ridership are not provided in the 
CBC Study, but one can extrapolate from the above value. 
Assume a one-way fare price of $3. At a single trip cost of $3, the number of pas-
senger boardings required to generate $6.11 million is about 2.036 million per year 
or 8,146 weekday boardings ([$6.11 million] / [$3 x 250 working days]). Assume 
for simplicity that 100 percent of the rides are generated by daily round trip com-
muters. This implies that the number of round trips assumed in the CBC study is 
4,073 round-trips per working day. Thus, at a one-way trip price of $3, the fare box 
revenue projections will be fulfilled if there are 4,073 daily round-trip commuters 
per working day. At a lower fare price of $2 per one-way trip, it can similarly be 
determined that the required number of daily round trip commuters is 6,110. 
Are the estimates for the number of riders above feasible? One way to answer this 
question is to look at the usage for current modes of transportation in Kansas City. 
Data from 2005 compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau on “Commuting to Work” 
indicates that, of the 914,000 daily commuters in the greater Kansas City metro 
area, an overwhelming number (800,0000 or 88%) drove alone; 80,731 (9%) car-
pooled, and 9,767 (1.07%) used public transportation. Clearly, public transporta-
tion is not a preferred transportation mode in Kansas City. However, the assumed 
number of daily commuters in the CBC study (4,073)—even given the disappoint-
ing number of current daily public transit users—seems low. The proposed Kansas 
City light rail system would serve a route corridor estimated to contain 250,000 
workers. If 1.63 percent of these workers would choose to use light rail, the rider-
ship estimates in the CBC study would be fulfilled. 
Ridership estimates are invariably subject to varying degrees of error. Suppose 
the problem is looked at somewhat differently and a related question is asked. 
Holding everything else constant, what is the lowest estimate of fare box revenues 
that would result in a break even NPV? The model suggests that fare box revenues 
of $14.47 million in the first year of the project (or more than twice the revenue 
assumed in the CBC Study) would result in a break-even NPV. Annual fare box 
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revenues of $14.47 million implies 14,470 round-trips per working day ([$14.47 
million] / [$4 round-trip cost x 250 days]). In fact, if the one-way trip cost was 
increased to $2.50 from $2, the required number of round-trips per day would be 
even lower, at 11,576.9 While options relating to sales tax revenues, bond funding, 
maturity of the bond issue, etc., do not seem to hold much promise, estimates for 
ridership in Kansas City seem to hold more promise. The reason for this is counter-
intuitive: the very fact that regions like Kansas City are so poorly served by public 
transportation constitutes an advantage in the sense that a good public transit 
system has a great deal of potential and much room to grow.
How likely are the ridership estimates above? Does light rail hold promise for Kan-
sas City? In this regard, the experience of St. Louis, Missouri may be instructive. 
In fact, if one wanted to use a reference city to draw a comparison with Kansas 
City, it would be difficult to come up with a better example than St. Louis. Besides 
being geographically proximate, both cities share strong cultural ties. St. Louis 
uses a light rail system called MetroLink, which consists of two lines that carry an 
average of 49,287 people each weekday. In 2006, a second line (Shrewsbury Line) 
opened for operation and within seven months reached ridership targets that 
were predicted to be reached eight years later. The St. Louis Dispatch (March 22, 
2007) reported that ”average weekday boardings vary month to month but were 
up 30,500 in January over the same month last year.… In four of the months since 
the line’s inauguration in August, average weekday ridership surpassed 63,000—a 
number that transportation planners thought would not be reached until 2015.” 
The St. Louis Dispatch argued that commuters, fed up with high gasoline prices and 
congested roadways, were finally beginning to consider public transportation as a 
serious alternative in the Midwest. If the experience of St. Louis is anything to go 
by, public transit’s time may have finally arrived in Kansas City. 
Operating Costs, Capital Costs and Federal Funding  
for the Heartland Light Rail Project
This section analyzes three aspects of the Heartland Light Rail project that are 
subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty—operating costs, capital costs, 
and federal funding—and then attempts to use the experience of other U.S. cit-
ies to construct realistic cost and funding estimates for the Heartland Light Rail 
Project.
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Operating Costs
Most criticism of light rail transit systems center around the high capital and oper-
ating costs of LRT systems as compared to bus systems. Table 7 compares operat-
ing costs for LRT and bus systems in 12 cities and then computes the operational 
cost savings from using a LRT system.
Table 7. Comparison of Operating Expenses per Passenger Mile (PM) for LRT 
versus Bus Systems in Selected Cities (2003)
Source: These values are derived from Table 12 (Transit Operating Expenses by Mode, Type of 
Service and Function) and Table 19 (Transit Operating Statistics: Service Supplied and Consumed) 
of the National Transit Database (NTB) 2003 figures. Annual LRT Operating Savings is computed 
by considering the cost advantage of LRT over bus systems and then multiplying the result by the 
number of annual LRT passenger miles. Note that negative figures imply that LRT is more expen-
sive than the bus system in that city. Values do not add up exactly because of rounding.10 
Clearly, LRT systems in most cities result in lower operating costs than bus sys-
tems.11 The results reported above can be reinforced by looking at the most recent 
data available from the National Transit Database on annual operating costs for 
LRT and bus systems for the U.S. as a whole. 
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Table 8. Comparison of Operating Expenses for  
Light Rail and Bus Systems in the U.S.
Source: See 2006 National Transit Profile, National Transit Database.
An approximation of the operational cost benefit of LRT systems over bus systems 
for the U.S. as a whole can be calculated thus. Since operating cost per LRT passen-
ger mile is $.20 cheaper than bus systems, and LRT accounted for 1,865.7 million 
passenger miles, the annual cost savings from LRT systems for the U.S. as a whole 
in 2006 was about $373 million. 
The bottom line is that operating costs are not a reasonable basis on which to 
criticize LRT systems. The empirical evidence is reasonably clear that operating 
expenses for LRT systems are lower than bus systems. Based on this experience, 
it can reasonably be concluded that, over the long run, operating expenses of the 
Heartland Light Rail would probably be lower than bus operating costs. 
Capital Costs
Even though operating costs of LRT systems are, on average, lower than bus 
systems, the capital costs of light rail systems are another matter. Data on con-
struction costs of light rail systems are not easily available. A recent paper by 
Baum-Snow and Kahn (2005) uses a variety of sources to provide an estimate 
of construction costs for major rail transit projects.12 The data reveal wide varia-
tions in construction costs, depending on the type of construction (see Table 9). 
The least-expensive lines are typically those that are built on the surface either 
as upgrades of existing railroad lines or on city streets. At the other extreme are 
bored tunnel lines, which can cost more than $300 million per mile. For instance, 
Seattle’s new LRT system is expected to cost $179 million per mile, while at the 
other extreme the LRT systems in Baltimore, Sacramento, and Salt Lake City cost 
less than $20 million per mile. Since most of these systems were built at different 
points in time, it is difficult to directly compare capital costs. Table 9 reports capi-
tal costs for major LRT projects in 2003 dollars13 to facilitate comparison with the 
LRT and bus operating cost data reported in Table 7. These capital costs are then 
amortized over 30 years at 7 percent per annum and reported in the third column 
of the table.14 Utilizing data from Table 7, the last column reports the annual 
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operational cost savings from using an LRT system. In comparing columns 3 and 
4, it is evident that, in every case, the amortized annual capital cost of LRT systems 
are invariably higher than the operational cost savings generated by LRT systems. 
Since operational savings of LRT systems do not cover their capital costs, a com-
mon argument is to expand bus service as a more feasible alternative to investing 
in capital intensive light rail projects. A recent paper by Thompson and Matoff 
(2003) analyzes bus systems in selected cities and comes to the conclusion that 
“regions that choose to improve their public transit systems based on express 
buses do not escape making heavy capital expenditures”(p. 311). Thompson and 
Matoff also point out that arguments based on “saving” money on capital invest-
ment projects and routing those savings to expanding bus services seem fallacious. 
They point out that: 
The region that made the smallest capital investment in its transit system—
Columbus—severely reduced the amount of service that it provided per capita. 
If the position of the critics were correct, Columbus, by not “wasting” funds on 
capital investment, should have had large resources left over to greatly expand 
its bus service; obviously, that has not happened…. It is clear that transit agencies 
that have pursued development of multidestinational networks that include rail 
Table 9. Estimated Light Rail Capital Costs
Note: The last column is derived from Table 7.
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for trunk lines have been able to generate significant ridership without sacrificing 
effectiveness, efficiency or equity. (p. 311). 
As pointed out earlier, the wide variations in capital costs of LRT systems arise 
primarily from the type of construction as well as factors like right of way acquisi-
tion costs. If one considers only projects since 2000 (and ignores an outlier such 
as Seattle), the approximate average construction costs per mile of an LRT system 
is about $35 million per mile. A base estimate for the Heartland Light Rail project, 
then, is $945 million ($35 million per mile x 27 miles). This value is, in fact, the same 
as that assumed in the Kansas City light rail ballot initiative. If one makes allow-
ances for cost escalations and inflation, a reasonable capital cost estimate for the 
Heartland Light Rail project is about $1 billion. This value is used in the subsequent 
sensitivity analysis.
Federal Funding
Even though the dollar value of federal capital funds assistance to transit agencies 
has been increasing over the last decade, the percentage contributed by federal 
agencies has been generally falling. The percentage of federal funding assumed in 
the Central Business Corridor Transit Study is 60 percent. This is an unrealistically 
high percentage that is out of line with the realities of current federal capital fund-
ing. The most recent data from the National Transit Database suggests that the 
current level of federal assistance is about 39 percent. This is used as a base value 
for federal assistance in the subsequent analysis.
In light of the above, previous values assumed in the Central Business Corridor plan 
are readjusted to reflect the current realities of capital costs and federal funding. In 
addition, the operating phase of the project is adjusted to be 25 years rather than 
the 17 years assumed in the Central Business Corridor study. The revised capital/
operating phase, cost, and revenue assumptions are reported in Table 10. 
The NPV based on these results is not encouraging. The Heartland Light Rail proj-
ect consistently runs a loss in almost every year, with the result that the project 
NPV is about -$343 million. (See the last column of Table 11 for the discounted 
project cash flow estimates). Given that capital and operating costs are not subject 
to a decrease, the only way that the project would be viable is if fare box revenues 
were to increase dramatically. What would fare revenues need to be for the project 
to break even? The financial model indicates that fare box revenues would have 
to be $52.27 million in the first year of the project with ridership increasing at 2 
percent p.a. over the 25-year operating phase of the project. At a single-trip fare 
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of $2.50, with a fare revenue of $52.27 million, implies 20.908 million annual pas-
senger boardings, or 41,816 weekday round-trip boardings. This level of ridership 
is not unattainable. The most recent data available from the St. Louis Metrolink 
system indicate that, over the annual period from July 2006 to June 2007, the 
Metrolink system accommodated 16.885 million or 33,772 round-trip weekday 
boardings15—an increase of 43 percent over the previous year. Moreover, the 
Kansas City transit corridor contains 250,000 jobs and an estimated population of 
about 300,000 within ½ to ¾ miles of the transit corridor.16 If these two factors are 
anything to go by, a weekday ridership that would eventually result in a project 
breakeven for the Kansas City LRT system is not out of the question. 
Table 10. Revised Project Cost/Revenue Assumptions 
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Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Heartland Light Rail Project
An important aspect to recognize about financial analysis is that, even though 
financial analysis of projects is invariably useful, the finances involved in a project 
essentially represent transfer payments between different economic entities—
e.g., from federal taxpayers to local economies or from one group of tax payers to 
another. A more comprehensive analysis should take into account the economic/
social costs and benefits generated by infrastructural projects. The previous sec-
tion implied that daily round trip ridership of the Heartland Light Rail project 
would have to be about 42,000 for the project to break even. Suppose the actual 
level of ridership falls far short of this level? Could the project still be justified based 
on other social benefit/social cost arguments?
There is a logical reason for the inability of most mass transit systems to be profit-
able. After a century of massive government investment in roads and highways, 
the cost of motor vehicle transportation is subsidized to such an extent that public 
transit systems find it impossible to raise fares by enough to be operationally self-
sufficient. Vuchic (1999)17 referring to a study by the U.S. Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) estimates that car drivers pay only about 60 percent of the 
total costs of their travel while the other 40 percent (highway construction costs, 
maintenance costs, etc.) is subsidized by different levels of government. Other 
implicit costs, such as free parking, are subsidized by employers, store owners, 
schools, etc., while various social and environmental costs are absorbed by society. 
It is, thus, hardly surprising that public transit systems are unable to compete 
against motor vehicle transportation. Henry and Dobbs (2005, p.3)18 make a simi-
lar argument: 
The competing roadway-based transportation systems … have been struc-
tured to minimize motorists’ out-of-pocket costs. The high costs of private 
motor vehicle travel are covered by a largely unobtrusive umbrella of public 
and private subsidization as well as the transfer of “external costs” (like acci-
dents and air pollution) to the general public…. Against this heavily subsi-
dized, government promoted competition, public transport operators find it 
impossible to charge fares high enough to secure “profitable” operation.” 
An estimate of the costs of auto transportation should, therefore, take into 
account the externalities imposed by auto traffic such as congestion, accidents, 
pollution, time delays, etc. Several studies provide estimates of the total cost of 
motor vehicle use. Among the most comprehensive are those by Delucchi (1996), 
Small (1997), Small (1999), Delucchi (1997),19 and Delucchi (2000). While the 
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1996 and 1997 studies by Delucchi provide estimates of the total cost of all motor 
vehicle usage, Delucchi (2000) breaks down the external costs of motor vehicle 
usage into costs for different transportation modes. Table 12 includes Delucchi’s 
estimates of the external costs of the two primary competing modes considered 
in this section—auto transportation and light rail transportation.20 
Table 12. External Costs of Passenger Transportation Modes  
(cents per vehicle mile)
 
The possible range of external costs per passenger mile for autos is 5 to 28 cents, or 
a mid-point cost estimate of 11.70 cents. If one subtracts the external cost of .35 
cents for light rail from this figure, the result (approximately 11 cents) constitutes 
an estimate of the external cost benefit provided by light rail over auto transporta-
tion. To this figure of 11 cents per passenger mile we need to add other positive 
externalities provided by LRT that were not explicitly valued in the Delucchi study. 
These include land use impact, preservation of wetlands, land erosion control, 
emission reduction benefits, conservation of non-renewable resources, rising 
property values around rail corridors, revitalization of transit corridors, enhanced 
mobility for the transit dependent, etc. In the current situation of rising gasoline 
prices, these positive externalities are likely to be considerable. 
Quantifying the social benefits that arise from light rail is not easy. While operat-
ing and capital costs of light rail are explicit and thus easily quantified, many of 
the social benefits conferred by light rail are implicit and therefore easily ignored 
in policy debates. The problem of overlapping benefits and double counting 
involved in quantifying external benefits adds to the uncertainty surrounding 
such estimates. However, such social benefits could, in fact, be considerable. The 
following examples from the literature provide some notion of the dollar values 
attributed to these externalities.21 McPhearson et al. (1997) estimate that increas-
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ing tree cover by 10 percent saves annual heating and cooling costs by $50 to $90 
per dwelling. They also estimate the NPV of a single tree to be $402. Riddel (2001) 
estimates that as a result of 15,000 acres of open space, housing prices in Boulder, 
Colorado increased an average of $10,000 for median-priced homes. Roe, Irwin and 
Morrow-Jones (2004) found that a 10 percent increase in the amount of farmland 
led to a rise in housing prices of $394 for lower priced homes and about $1,100 for 
higher priced homes. Kiker and Hodges (2002) estimated the economic benefits 
of natural lands in Northeast Florida at $2.6 billion per year. A subsequent study 
by Kroeger (2005) extended the Kiker and Hodges’ work to other types of benefits 
and arrived at an even higher value of $3.2 billion per year.22 Table 13 summarizes 
the cost estimates provided by various studies on land use impact effects:23 
Table 13. Land Use Impact of Auto Travel
 
The land use impact estimates in Table 13 are subject to a substantial degree of 
uncertainty. Some of the effects reported above may be double counted; other 
effects are ignored since they simply cannot be easily quantified. The most sig-
nificant of the non-quantified effects is the effect of light rail transit on property 
values. Suppose for the time being we ignore this effect. The fundamental politi-
cal issue then centers on whether the “subsidy” to rail transit (the negative NPV 
of $343 million that was computed in the earlier section) could be offset by the 
implicit positive externalities conferred by the LRT system. How large would these 
externality benefits need to be? A negative NPV of $343 million over 33 years dis-
counted at 7 percent p.a. implies that the LRT system would have to confer annual 
benefits of $26.89 million every year for 33 years for the project to break even. Are 
savings of such magnitude feasible?
The external cost estimates above imply that a conservative estimate of the net 
external cost savings from light rail over auto transport is about 11 cents per pas-
senger mile. The land use impact savings from LRT adds another 14 cents, for a 
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total of 25 cents. Since there is almost certainly some element of double counting 
between Delucchi’s estimates and the land use impact effects reported in Table 
13, assume that the land use impact effect is not 14 cents but only half as much, 
or 7 cents. This results in a net external cost savings of 18 cents per passenger mile. 
Given that the average driver’s round-trip work commute is about 30 miles per 
day in Kansas City,24 this implies that annual external cost savings would be $26.89 
million if the number of cars would decrease by 19,919 per workday ($.18/mile x 
30 miles/day x 250 days/year x 19,919 cars).25 In other words, if 19,919 cars were 
taken off the roads because of a travel mode shift from auto travel to light rail 
transit, the Heartland Light Rail project would be justifiable based on the savings 
in external costs alone.
The external cost savings of 18 cents per mile is one possible estimate of external 
costs. A larger estimate of external costs is provided in a comprehensive study 
conducted by the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (VTPI) on the externalities 
imposed by motor vehicle travel. The VTPI study considers 20 different cost cat-
egories separated into internal and external costs, including such external costs 
as parking, congestion, land value, transport diversity, pollution, noise, barrier 
effects, waste, etc.,and estimates such external costs26 at 59 cents per vehicle mile, 
more than three times the 18 cents in external cost savings considered earlier. This 
implies that the required decrease in the number of cars is even lower at 6,077 cars 
per work day to generate the equal annuity amount of $26.89 million ($.59/mile x 
30 miles/day x 250 days/year x 6,077 cars).27 
It should be noted that the external cost estimates used above do not take into 
consideration the effect that light rail would have on property values. The Cen-
tral Business Corridor Transit Plan estimates that the Heartland light rail project 
would stimulate new investment of more than U$ 1 billion, increase employment 
by about 13,000 and provide new annual taxes of about U$17 million.28 If these 
property impact estimates are even marginally correct, it is then quite probable 
that the substantial overhead costs involved in light rail would essentially pay for 
itself through its externality effects. 
Conclusion
The Heartland Light Rail project represents Kansas City’s biggest infrastructural 
investment in decades. The ballot initiative for the light rail project was voted 
down three times until it was finally approved in November 2006. The very fact 
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that the light rail project idea was so resilient in the face of strenuous opposition 
provides some evidence that LRT may be an idea whose time has finally arrived in 
Kansas City. 
A strict financial analysis of the project is not encouraging. Using best estimates of 
construction costs, operating expenses and federal funding, the NPV of the proj-
ect is estimated to be negative $343 million. However, if one were to include the 
annual savings in external costs from lower auto travel, the Kansas City light rail 
project becomes an increasingly attractive option. 
Since light rail projects involve substantial public funding a debate on their costs 
and benefits appropriately belongs in the domain of public policy. A major prob-
lem, however, in rationally evaluating the merits of such projects is that the public 
dialogue is often complicated by studies that make their case by either considering 
only costs that are explicit or ignoring non-monetized, implicit social benefits. The 
truth seems to be that if evaluated on a strict financial basis alone, light rail systems 
are unlikely to be completely self-sufficient. However, if light rail losses are not of 
such a magnitude that the project is completely unfeasible, it is very probable that 
social benefits could still render such projects worthwhile. 
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Endnotes
1 The Road Information Program (TRIP), “Rough Ride in the City: Metro Areas 
with the Roughest Rides and Strategies to Make our Roads Smoother,” October 
2006. 
2 “Central Business Corridor Transit Plan,” Final Report, April 27, 2001. 
3 These data are from the 2003 Highway Statistics published by the Federal High-
way Administration (FHWA).
4 See the Texas Transportation Institute’s 2004 Urban Mobility Study. 
Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
84
5 See Chart 3 (page 16) of The Road Information Program (TRIP), “Rough Ride in 
the City: Metro Areas with the Roughest Rides and Strategies to Make our Roads 
Smoother,” October 2006. 
6 Typically, a project’s cost of capital should be computed as a weighted aver-
age cost of capital (WACC) where the weights are the proportions of debt and 
equity and the costs pertain to the cost of debt and cost of equity. The cost of 
equity is typically determined using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
This method of estimating WACC is inapplicable for publicly funded projects 
since no equity is issued. An approximate cost of capital for the Kansas City LRT 
project can be determined thus. The cost of capital of a project is linked to the 
risk of the underlying assets supporting the project. In 2007, Kansas City issued 
General Obligation (GO) bonds at a yield of 4.60%. Assuming that the LRT proj-
ect is more risky than Kansas City’s asset base, we can add a “premium” over 
the yield of Kansas City GO bonds. Adding a premium of 200 basis points or 2% 
results in the assumed project cost of capital of 7%. For a detailed discussion of 
project valuation see Chapter 19 of Principles of Corporate Finance, “Financing 
and Valuation,” Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006).  
7 Note that the project is non-normal—that is, negative cash flows occur during 
the life of the project. In such situations, the IRR criterion can be misleading. In 
the subsequent analysis, the IRR values are not reported for this reason. 
8 I continue to assume that operating costs will increase by 4% p.a. from the base 
year estimate of operating and maintenance costs. 
9 Given that the American Public Transportation Association has estimated that 
the total cost of riding public transportation (including transfers, parking, etc.) 
at a base fare of $2.50 is $2454/year versus estimated driving costs for midsize 
cars of $8,580/year, public transportation seems a bargain. However, whether 
the public perceives it this way, especially in auto dependent areas like Kansas 
City, remains to be seen.
10 Some of these values are also reported in Toole (2005), “Does Light Rail Pay for 
Itself?” (see www.ti.org/vaupdate57.html). I follow a similar logic to that in the 
article in determining operational cost savings for light rail. The sample set of 
cities reported in the table is limited to those cities for which construction costs 
for light rail are available. This is to facilitate a comparison of operational cost 
with capital costs. See a subsequent section of this paper. 
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11 An important part of the reason is that since light rail systems serve the densest 
transit corridors, operational costs for light rail generally tend to be lesser than 
low passenger density serving bus systems. 
12 See Table 1 of Baum-Snow and Kahn (2005). Data for LRT capital costs in some 
major cities is unfortunately not available. For instance, data on capital costs for 
both D.C. and Chicago’s rail transit system are unavailable.
13 Construction cost data from the Baum-Snow and Kahn (2005) paper is con-
verted into 2003 dollars and reported in Toole (2005), “Does Light Rail Pay for 
Itself?” (see www.ti.org/vaupdate57.html). 
14 The average life span of rail hardware is 30 years. The amortization rate of 7% is 
prescribed by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) for amortizing capital 
costs. See Toole (2005).
15 “Metro System Ridership” numbers reported on www.metrostlouis.org
16 This estimate is contained in the Kansas City Long Range Transportation Plan, 
Figure 5-7, pp. 5-13. See also Exhibits 1 and 2 that depict the spatial and demo-
graphic characteristics of the primary transit corridor. 
17 Vuchic, Transportation for Livable Cities, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rut-
gers University, December 1999. 
18 Henry and Dobbs, “Why St. Louis’s MetroLink Light Railway is a Mobility Bar-
gain,” May 2005. Available on www.lightrailnow.org 
19 Delucchi (1997) is a comprehensive study of the total social cost of motor 
vehicle use based on 20 reports published by the UC Institute of Transportation 
Studies, Davis. Delucchi (1996) provides a summary of the 1997 study. 
20 The estimates here are extracted from page 12 of Delucchi (2000). In the actual 
table provided by Delucchi, there is an estimate of government subsidies for 
light rail which increases the total external cost of light rail. I ignore this subsidy 
for light rail since my focus here is to ask the question, Are the positive externali-
ties provided by light rail sufficient to offset the cost disadvantages arising from 
the high capital cost of the Heartland LRT System? 
21 See Banzhaf and Jawahar (2005) for a comprehensive introduction to this lit-
erature. 
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22 The underlying research in both these papers contributed to a provision passed 
by the Florida legislature in 2005. The provision encourages local governments 
to require a full cost accounting analysis for any proposed new development.
23 See Litman (2007), Table 5.14-13, p. 5.14-21.
24 U.S. Census Bureau data indicate that the mean travel time to work in Missouri 
is about 23 minutes. At 40 mph, this indicates an average one-way commute of 
about 15 miles. 
25 This calculation assumes one passenger per car. In addition to these external 
costs, TRIP estimates that the poor condition of roads in Kansas City imposes an 
additional operational cost per automobile of $651 per year.
26 Victoria Transport Policy Institute, Transportation Cost and Benefit Analysis, 
May 2007 (available on www.vtpi.org). See Table 6-6 on pp. 6-10. 
27 In addition to these external costs, TRIP estimates that the poor condition of 
roads in Kansas City impose an additional operational cost per automobile of 
$651 per year.
28 See Appendix B of the Central Business Corridor Transit Plan, Final Report. 
29 See Castelazo and Garrett (2004)’s “Light Rail: Boon or Boondogle,” which 
invokes the “give them a Toyota Prius instead” argument. A response to this 
study is contained in Henry and Dobbs (2005), “Why St. Louis’s Metro Link Rail-
way in a Mobility Bargain.”
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Abstract
This paper addresses an unconventional design for accommodating bus U-turns 
at signalized intersections based on a case study in Miami, Florida. Field data were 
collected at the study site, including traffic volumes, traffic conflicts, pedestrian/
bicyclist activities, signal phase sequence, headway of buses, and radii of bus U-turns. 
A detailed operational analysis was performed at the signalized intersection using 
Synchro. The results of the operational analysis indicate that implementation of the 
unconventional bus U-turn design at the signalized intersection will not cause major 
operational problems when the total entering volume is less than 4,000 vehicles per 
hour. To address the safety concerns at the study intersection, both crash analysis 
and conflict analysis were conducted. A review of accident data for the subject 
intersection indicates that accidents related to the bus U-turn occur infrequently. 
The eight-hour conflicts analysis showed that very few conflicts were caused by bus 
U-turn movements. 
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Introduction
Many studies about the operational and safety effects of U-turns at unsignalized 
and signalized intersections have been conducted. Past research results show that 
there is no evidence to prove that U-turns at medians or signalized intersections 
present major safety or operational problems (Potts et al. 2004, Carter et al. 2005, 
Zhou et al. 2002). However, few studies have been found to deal with heavy vehicle 
U-turns. There is typically inadequate geometry for a bus to make a U-turn from 
the exclusive left-turn lane at most signalized intersections. This paper addresses 
an unconventional design for accommodating a bus U-turn at a signalized inter-
section based on a case study in Miami, Florida. 
Background
Miami-Dade Transit (MDT) was requested by the City of Sunny Isles Beach to 
evaluate the safety of buses on Routes E and S that make a U-turn at the inter-
section of Collins Avenue (SR A1A) and Galahad Dade Boulevard (193rd Street). 
Presently, both of these routes require northbound buses to make U-turns at the 
subject intersection, then return southward along Collins Avenue before continu-
ing on to the Aventura Mall.
Purpose
The purpose of this analysis is to provide policy makers with an objective assess-
ment of the traffic operations and safety of the current routing at the subject 
intersection. In addition, this study indicates under what traffic conditions the 
unconventional design for bus U-turn may cause traffic congestion and safety 
problems.
Existing Conditions
A site review was conducted to assess the existing operational and design char-
acteristics of the intersection on December 14 and 15, 2004. The study intersec-
tion is located at Collins Avenue (SR A1A) and Galahad Dade Boulevard (193rd 
Street). The major roadway direction is north-south bound on SR A1A, which is a 
four-lane, divided arterial with a speed limit of 35 mph. The minor roadway direc-
tion is east-west bound on 193rd Street. The east side of the intersection is the 
entrance to a residential condominium, Ocean One. The west side of 193rd Street 
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is a private two-lane street that provides access to OceanView. An unconventional 
U-turn lane for bus was installed before the residential condominium was built in 
2001. Figure 1 shows the intersection layout at the subject intersection.  
Figure. 1 Intersection Layout at the Subject Intersection
At the intersection, the northbound buses that will be making the U-turn are 
channelized and separated to the right of the adjacent through-traffic by a striped 
separator of approximately six feet. The traffic signals for the bus U-turn and the 
northbound left-turns are optically programmed signal heads, which restrict the 
visibility of these indications in adjacent lanes.  This helps to keep northbound 
through-traffic on Collins from being confused by the conflicting indication for 
the bus U-turn.  
Data Collection
Field data were collected on December 14 and 15, 2004. A video camera was used 
to record traffic operations at the intersection from the top of Marco Polo Ramada 
Plaza Beach Resort, located approximately 1,000 feet south of the intersection. A 
total of eight hours of videotape was recorded, including two AM peak hours, two 
PM peak hours, two noon hours, and two non-peak hours.
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Traffic data were obtained from the videotapes. While reviewing the videotapes, 
researchers tracked each vehicle movement at the intersection, especially the bus 
U-turn movements. The following information was recorded:
•	 eight-hour	turning	movement	counts	
•	 traffic	conflicts
•	 pedestrian/bicyclist	activities
•	 signal	phase	sequences
•	 headways	of	buses
•	 radii	of	bus	U-turns
Crash data for the subject intersection were provided by the Florida Department 
of Transportation, District 6 Traffic Operations Office. The crash data were pulled 
for three years, from 2001 to 2003. The system timing data for the subject intersec-
tion were obtained from Miami-Dade County.
Additionally, the data collection phase involved a meeting with representatives 
from the City of Sunny Isles Beach to assess their concerns about the bus U-turn 
at this intersection.  The expressed concerns are summarized as follows:
•	 U-turning	of	buses	across	the	intersection	is	an	unusual	and	unexpected	
maneuver; this could cause confusion for unfamiliar motorists (tourists and 
visitors).
•	 U-turning	of	buses	causes	congestion	at	the	intersection.
•	 U-turn	maneuvers	cause	traffic	safety	concerns.
•	 U-turning	 buses	 create	 a	 possible	 hazard	 for	 people	 standing	 on	 the	
southwest corner of the intersection due to the tracking of the U-turning 
buses.
•	 Exhaust	fumes	from	the	buses	pollute	the	area	of	Ocean	One.
•	 Buses	waiting	in	the	bus	lane	block	the	visibility	of	bicyclists	and	pedestrians,	
especially for northbound traffic turning right (across the bus lane) into the 
Ocean One condominium entrance. 
The City has suggested that Miami-Dade Transit consider relocating the U-turn 
for routes E and S up to Hallandale Beach Boulevard, approximately 3 miles to the 
north.
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Operational Analysis
The subject intersection currently operates at an acceptable level of service (LOS) 
based on the eight-hour field observation on a typical weekday. The intersection 
geometry, traffic volumes, and signal timing data were collected for a detailed 
analysis. Synchro 6.0 software was used to perform the capacity and LOS analyses 
for four different time periods: AM peak hours (7:00-9:00 AM), noon peak hours 
(11:00 AM-1:00 PM), PM peak hours (4:00-6:00 PM), and non-peak hours. Synchro is 
a complete software package for modeling and optimizing traffic signal timings and 
implements the methods of the 2000 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM), Chapter 16, 
“Signalized Intersections”. It provides an easy-to-use solution for single intersection 
capacity analysis and timing optimization. Synchro defaults to calculate the percen-
tile delay, which is different from the HCM’s average control delay. Synchro’s output 
also provides the average control delay based on the HCM methods. 
The HCM’s average control delays from Synchro’s output are summarized in Table 
1. As listed in Table 1, the overall intersection currently operates at LOS “A” during 
the AM peak hours and noon time, and at LOS “B” during the afternoon and PM 
peak hours. Bus U-turn volume is approximately 15 buses per hour for both peak 
and non-peak hours. The bus headway is about four minutes for buses making a 
U-turn at the intersection. The average control delay of U-turning buses is approx-
imately 53 seconds per vehicle. The LOS of bus U-turns is “D.” The through-traffic 
on SR A1A operates at LOS “A” or “B”. The left-turn and right-turn vehicles from 
the minor road operate at an acceptable LOS “D.” The analysis results show that 
the bus U-turn does not cause major operational problems at the intersection. 
This is because the overall intersection is currently operating at level of service “A” 
or “B,” and no individual lane group is worse than LOS D. 
To determine under what volume conditions adding a bus U-turn will significantly 
increase the overall delay at the intersection, additional operational analyses were 
conducted by gradually increasing the traffic volumes at the intersection. All 
approaches received the same percentage increase, except the bus U-turn volume. 
Figure 2 shows the impact of increasing the bus volumes and total volumes entering 
the intersections. Four curves were developed for bus volumes: 0, 10, 20, and 30 buses 
per hour. According to the Highway Capacity Manual, the LOS of the intersection is 
“E” when the average delay is greater than 55 seconds per vehicle. Figure 2 indicates 
the intersection operates at LOS “E” when the bus volume and total volume entering 
the intersection are (30, 4500), (20, 5000), (10, 5375), and (0, 6375). 
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This implies that an increase in bus volume from 0 to 10 buses per hour could 
reduce capacity by 16 percent, an increase in bus volume from 10 to 20 buses per 
hour could reduce an additional 7 percent, and an increase in bus volume from 
20 to 30 buses per hour would reduce capacity by another 10 percent. Figure 2 
also suggests that the intersection always operates at LOS “C” or better when the 
Table 1. Level of Service (LOS) at the Study Intersection
 
Figure 2. Impact of Bus Volumes on the Intersection Delays
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total volume entering the intersection is less than 4,000 vehicles per hour and bus 
U-turn volume is no more than 30 buses per hour.
Safety Analysis
Both crash analysis and conflict analysis were conducted to evaluate the safety 
of the subject intersection. Data collected include three-year crash data and 
eight-hour videotape for traffic conflicts. Researchers paid special attention to 
the crashes and conflicts caused by U-turning buses. Both crash frequency and 
crash rates are used for crash analysis, and the number of conflicts and conflict 
rates were computed for conflicts analysis. The percentage of crashes and conflicts 
related to bus U-turns were used to indicate the impacts of bus U-turns on the 
intersection safety.
Crash Analysis
Crash data at the subject intersection were collected for a three-year period (2001 
to 2003). The total number of recorded crashes was approximately 27 in the 
three-year period, an average of 9 crashes per year. This number is relatively low 
when compared to the high crash intersection with over 15 crashes per year in the 
county.  Five of the crashes were bus-related. All five were property-damage-only 
crashes. There were two bus-related accidents in 2001 and 2002, and one accident 
related to bus U-turns in 2003. The accidents involving the bus were caused mainly 
by careless driving or the ignoring of the traffic signal by the other drivers. 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 illustrate the percentages of each type of crash in the years 2001, 
2002, and 2003, respectively. Figure 6 shows the percentage of each type of crash 
in the three-year period. Approximately 64 percent of the total crashes were rear-
end and sideswipe, especially on southbound SR A1A. These two types of crashes 
are caused by the unexpected left turns from southbound SR A1A and the block-
age problem on the right-turn-only lane by the bus stop approximately 200 feet 
away from the intersection on southbound SR A1A.
It is interesting that the total number of crashes has dropped from 13 in 2001 to 5 
in 2003. The corresponding crash rates also were significantly reduced, from 1.32 
to 0.50 (accidents per million entering vehicles) from 2001 to 2003. The number 
of injuries also has dropped from 6 to 1 from 2001 to 2003. This implies that the 
intersection safety has improved in the last few years. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the 
trend of crash frequency and crash rates from 2001 to 2003.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Crash Type in 2001
Figure 4. Distribution of Crash Type in 2002
Figure 5. Distribution of Crash Type in 2003
Legend: LT=left turn, RT=right turn, RE=rear end, SS=side swipe
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Figure 6. Distribution of Crash Type, 2001 - 2003
Figure 7. Change of Crash Frequency, 2001 - 2003
Figure 8. Change of Crash Rates, 2001 – 2003 
(accidents per million entering vehicles)
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The critical crash rate method was used to determine the safety level of the study 
intersection. This statistical tool can be used to screen for high-accident locations 
by utilizing a confidence interval that can be adjusted up or down to accommo-
date the needs of a particular safety program. If a segment has an actual crash 
rate higher than the critical rate, the location may have a potential highway safety 
deficiency and may need additional analysis. To compute the critical crash rate for 
a site, the following equation was used:
F
c
=F+k(F/M)
1/2 +1/(2M)
Where:
F
c 
= the critical crash rate
F = statewide average crash rate 
K = a probability constant. K = 3.291 for a 99.95% confidence level for 
urban area
M = vehicle exposure, calculated per million entering vehicles (MEV)
The Florida statewide average crash rates for intersections that have the charac-
teristics of being 4-5 lanes, 2-way, divided, raised, and 4-leg  are 0.479, 0.473, and 
0.445 crashes per million vehicles for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively. 
Based on the above equation, the corresponding critical crash rates for the year 
2001, 2002, and 2003 are 1.26, 1.32, and 1.19, respectively.  The crash rates in the 
years 2002 and 2003 are less than their critical crash rates. The crash rate in the 
year 2001 is a slightly higher than its critical crash rate. However, the actual average 
crash rate for the three-year period is 0.89 at the intersections, which is lower than 
the critical crash rate of 1.25 during the same period. This implies that the location 
has no potential safety deficiency.
Conflicts Analysis
The purpose of the conflicts analysis is to identify the potential conflicts between 
buses and other vehicles or pedestrians/bicyclists.  Traffic conflicts are interactions 
between two or more drivers where one or both drivers take an evasive maneuver 
to avoid a collision (Robertson et al. 1994, Parker and Zegeer 1988, Parker and 
Zegeer 1988a).  In this study, traffic conflicts at the intersection were used as an 
additional measure to quantify the safety effects of bus U-turns at the intersection. 
These conflict types are: 
99
An Unconventional Design for Bus U-Turns at Signalized Intersections
•	 slow	vehicle,	same	direction	conflict	(C1)
•	 lane	change	conflict	(C2)
•	 bus	U-turn	conflict	(C3)
•	 angle	conflict	(C4)
•	 pedestrian	and	vehicle	conflict	(C5)
Based on this definition of traffic conflict, an occurrence was considered as a con-
flict when a vehicle applied brakes, swerved, or noticeably decelerated to avoid a 
collision. Data were extracted by tracking each vehicle movement from videotapes 
for an eight-hour period.
As shown in Table 2, a total of 48 conflicts were recorded by videotape. Most of 
the conflicts were of type C1 (16 rear-end conflicts), and type C2 (17 lane change 
conflicts).  This is due to the fact that there is a bus stop on the outside lane of 
southbound SR A1A that becomes a right-turn-only lane providing access to the 
Lehman Causeway. 
Table 2. Summary of Traffic Conflicts Observed in the Field
 
The signal phase sequence at this intersection has the bus U-turn, followed by 
the northbound protected-left-turn (with concurrent through-traffic), followed 
by the northbound and southbound through-green, then the east-west move-
ments. Due to the heavy use of the bus stop mentioned above, passenger loading 
and unloading time is typically greater than the time allotted for the northbound 
protected-left-turn phase. Thus, the southbound through-vehicles are released 
prior to the bus leaving the stop. This results in brief periods of congestion where 
vehicles have to slow down or make a quick lane change to avoid the stopped bus. 
This is how most of the observed rear-end and sideswipe conflicts occurred.
A total of 10 angle conflicts (type C4) were recorded. A few vehicles (average 2-4 
vehicles per hour) were observed attempting to make a left turn from southbound 
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SR A1A into Ocean One, which caused angle conflicts with northbound through-
vehicles because it is a prohibited movement. Some conflicts also were observed 
between left-turning vehicles from Ocean One and right-turning vehicles from 
OceanView. A total of two conflicts caused by bus U-turns were observed in eight 
hours. 
Two types of conflict rates were calculated. The first one is the ratio between con-
flicts and the number of hours of observation. The number of conflicts per hour 
shows the conflicts that might be found during different hours of the day. The sec-
ond one corresponds to the ratio between conflicts and traffic volumes. This rate 
is defined as the number of conflicts per thousand involved vehicles by maneu-
ver type. As shown in Table 2, there were, on average, 6 conflicts in an hour and 
approximately 2.7 conflicts per thousand vehicles involved at the intersection.
Overall, it was found that the results of the conflict study are very consistent with 
the crash analysis. Based on the limited number of conflicts and crashes caused by 
bus U-turns, there is no indication that U-turning buses are a major safety concern 
at the subject intersection. 
Observations and Conclusions
To overcome geometric constraints, an unconventional design was implemented 
to accommodate the U-turn of the buses at the intersection. Based on our obser-
vations at the intersection, Florida DOT and Dade County Traffic Engineers have 
done an outstanding job in accommodating this unusual situation in the best 
manner possible. With the use of optically-programmed traffic signals, the confu-
sion to the motorists should be minimal. To unsuspecting motorists, there should 
not be any conflicting information displayed—they simply see standard traffic 
signal indications. When it is the bus’s turn to go, the motorists see a red signal and 
should be expected to understand and abide by it.  
The results of operational analysis show that the subject intersection currently 
operates at LOS “A” during AM peak hours and LOS “B” in PM peak hours. The 
average delay for the overall intersection is approximately 9-12 seconds per 
vehicle. Signal timing and the phase sequence are proper for accommodating the 
special bus U-turn movements and appear to do so as effectively and efficiently 
as can be expected. The more-detailed operational analysis indicates that imple-
mentation of the unconventional bus U-turn design at the signalized intersection 
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will not cause major operational problems when the total entering volumes is less 
than 4,000 vehicles per hour at the studied location.
The eight-hour conflicts analysis showed that very few conflicts were caused by 
bus U-turn movements. A review of accident data for the subject intersection 
indicates that accidents related to the bus U-turn occur infrequently. There are, 
on average, 1.7 crashes related to the bus U-turns per year. The accidents involv-
ing the bus were caused primarily by careless driving or the ignoring of the traffic 
signal by other drivers. Crash analysis also indicated that intersection safety has 
improved significantly over the three-year period. Based on these limited accident 
frequencies and number of conflicts, there is no indication that the bus U-turn at 
the subject intersection constitutes a major safety concern.
Of significance is the fact that approximately 64 percent of total crashes are rear-
end and sideswipe collisions. These two types of crashes are caused by unexpected 
left turns from southbound SR A1A and the blockage problem of the right-turn-
only lane by the bus stop approximately 200 feet south of the intersection.
It was observed that most buses did not stop behind the stop bar on the bus-U-
turn-only lane. The bus lane’s stop line is set back from the stop bar for north-
bound through-traffic on A1A to provide adequate sight distance for vehicles that 
are turning right into Ocean One. On some occasions, the buses initially stopped 
in the proper location, but continued to creep up over the stop bar and, on one 
occasion, completely over the crosswalk.
Some buses were observed making much larger U-turns than the U-turn pave-
ment markings in the intersection. As indicated by the City, the bus is close to the 
curb as it completes its U-turn. Figure 9 shows the damaged curb from vehicles 
making the U-turn maneuver. However, as U-turning speeds are typically very low, 
the potential for serious crashes is also relatively low.
Relocating the U-turn to Hallandale Beach Boulevard, as suggested by the City, 
would add approximately 10 minutes to the bus routes. This would require the 
addition of another bus to the route to maintain the current bus headways. 
Additionally, this represents an unwanted increase in travel time to the existing 
bus patrons. It is doubtful that extending these routes would help to serve any 
additional transit customers, in that the areas to the north are currently served by 
other Miami-Dade Transit and Broward County Transit routes. 
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Figure 9. Possible Damage on the Curb from Bus U-Turns
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